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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
 
This dissertation investigates food safety regulations and international trade of 
agricultural products dividing into three aspects: the signalling effect from U.S. strict 
food safety regulations on U.S. vegetable exports, political determinants of sanitary and 
photosanitary non-tariff barriers, and the impact of trade barriers on employment in 
developing countries. In chapter 2, we investigate the impact of high U.S. maximum 
residue limit (MRL) standards on U.S vegetable exports to 102 countries utilizing the 
hierarchical model. MRL, which is one of non-tariff barriers with respect to food safety, 
is applied to home and foreign countries at the same time. Thus, firms in countries with 
higher food safety standards are expected to have a competitive advantage from the 
‘signalling effect’. The results show that high MRL standards in the U.S. have a positive 
impact on U.S. vegetable exports, indicating the ‘signalling effect’ from the strict U.S. 
domestic MRL standards. The results provide policy makers with insights into how strict 
food safety regulations of the home country can be considered as a catalyst for increasing 
competitiveness in international markets. 
In chapter 3, we examine the political determinants of SPS notifications using a nonlinear 
threshold model with possible threshold variables (GDP per capita and tariff rate). This 
article finds no threshold values in both variables of GDP per capita and tariff rate. Our 
results also show that GDP per capita has a positive relationship with SPS notifications 
that are one of proxy variables for food quality. That implies the importance of quality 
competition in agriculture and food sectors. Our finding also represents no significant 
effect of tariff on SPS notifications. This indicates that a law of constant protection, 
presenting an inverse relationship between tariff and non-tariff barriers, is not satisfied in 
the agricultural and food sectors.  
In chapter 4, we investigate the impact of tariff and SPS barriers on food manufacturers’ 
skilled and unskilled employment in developing countries utilizing a structural equation 
model. Results show that both tariff and SPS barriers have a positive effect on unskilled 
labor employment in developing countries, while trade barriers are not associated with 
 
 
skilled labor employment. This implies that Hecksher-Ohlin theory, presenting labor 
abundant countries have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries such as 
food, explains well our results since developing countries are abundant in low-skilled 
labor. We also find that the age of food firm in developing countries is positively related 
to skilled employment; however, no relationship with unskilled employment. This 
implies that older food firms change their production process from labor intensive to 
capital or machine intensive. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction and Overview 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), global food safety concerns 
have arisen due to several hazards such as microbiological hazards and chemical food 
contaminants. As the globalization trend has expanded, the risk of food safety problems 
has also increased because of increased trade of agricultural products. To address the 
international food safety concerns, the Codex Alimentarius international food standard 
was introduced by the WHO and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO). Furthermore, the World Trade Organization (WTO) established the 
Sanitary and Photosanitary (SPS) agreement on January 1995, which sets food safety and 
animal and plant health rules and regulations. 
 These food safety regulations play a role as non-tariff barriers due to the impeding 
role of high food safety regulations on trade of agricultural products. Some political 
economists such as Bhagwati (1989) argue that many countries set up high non-tariff 
barriers such as food safety regulations to protect farmers from world-wide globalization 
pressures. Other political economists such as Ray (1981) find that countries with high 
tariff barriers have a tendency to have high non-tariff barriers. In other words, political 
economists have debated on the relationship between tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Therefore, investigating the relationship between food safety regulations (one of non-
tariff barriers) and tariff barrier is expected to contribute and fill a gap in previous 
political economic studies. 
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 Contrary to non-tariff barriers such as quotas, food safety regulations such as 
MRL are applied to domestic and foreign agricultural products at the same time. Thus, 
food safety regulations are expected to have a different effect on agri-food sectors 
compared to other non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers such as quotas only have a 
protection role, while food safety regulations have both characteristics of impeding and 
promoting trade. The promoting role of food safety regulations is stem from experience 
or signalling effect. If exporting firms experience strict food safety regulations in their 
home countries, then they might export easily due to the easy adaption to foreign food 
safety criteria or gain a competitive advantage from strict food safety regulations.  
 Trade liberalization is closely related to technology transfer, innovation, 
competition, and specialization. These factors are positively associated with productivity 
that is negatively related to employment. That implies the possible relationship between 
trade and employment. Thus, food safety regulations, one of non-tariff barriers in 
agricultural and food sectors, also are expected to have a relationship with employment. 
Large share of tariff barriers have eliminated or reduced by trade agreements or WTO 
regime, while food safety regulations have increased due to human health or protection 
purpose. In other words, the importance of food safety regulations on employment in 
agricultural and food sectors has increased.   
 This dissertation focuses on food safety regulations and international trade of 
agricultural products by investigating the three questions outlined above. Three research 
questions are investigated by each of following three essays. The first essay (Chapter 2), 
entitled: “The ‘Signalling Effect’ and the Impact of High Maximum Residue Limit 
Standards on the U.S. Vegetable Exports,” investigates the probability that a home 
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country’s strict food safety regulations may improve a home country’s competitiveness 
by the ‘signalling effect’.  
The second essay (Chapter 3), entitled: “Political Determinants of Sanitary and 
Photosanitary Notifications: Testing the Law of Constant Protection and Food Safety 
Demand,” tests the law of constant protection, which is an inverse relationship between 
trade and non-tariff barriers. Furthermore, the second essay investigates the determinants 
of SPS notifications using a nonlinear threshold model with GDP per capita and tariff rate 
variables by focusing on political factors 
The third essay (Chapter 4), entitled: “Trade Barrier Effects of Sanitary and 
Photosanitary on Skilled and Unskilled Workers in Food Manufacturing Firms,” 
investigates food safety related non-tariff barrier reduction effects on unemployment, 
differentiating between skilled and unskilled workers. Utilizing the structural equation 
model, this chapter divides the impact of trade barriers on employment into direct effects 
(technology effect) and indirect effects (production quantity change caused by trade 
barriers). 
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and implications of each chapter of this 
dissertation. In addition, future related studies are discussed. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The ‘Signalling Effect’ and the Impact of High Maximum Residue Limit Standards 
on U.S. Vegetable Exports 
2.1 Introduction 
Food safety standards have been on the rise as world income has increased for the 
last few decades, partly due to the fact that high income consumers are more sensitive to 
health and safety concerns. Most governments set Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
standards such as Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) in order to protect consumers. As 
governments have implemented more and stricter food safety regulations, trade disputes 
have increased among the countries involved. A total of 17,373 SPS notifications were 
submitted to the WTO during 1995 to 2014 (WTO Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal). 
RTAs have also increased during the last few decades, which in turn, have raised the call 
for more domestic market protection. RTAs have an important role in the reduction of 
tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions among countries. WTO reported receiving 612 
notifications of RTAs through 4/7/2015 (WTO Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal).  
Some studies have argued that non-tariff barriers (like SPS regulations) have 
increased because governments want to protect their producers (Götz et al., 2010). Even 
when a government’s purpose for an SPS standard is for food safety concerns and 
consumer protection, political economists have raised concerns about the protectionist 
impacts of SPS and other technical barriers (Götz et al., 2010; Kastner and Pawsey, 2002; 
Peterson and Orden, 2008). Hence, the importance of understanding the impacts of non-
tariff barriers (such as SPS standards) has increased for agricultural trade. 
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There are different views concerning the effects of SPS standards on 
competitiveness. Henson and Jaffee (2008) have shown that tighter standards can be a 
source of competitive advantage for certain countries. One possible explanation for this is 
the signalling the quality of agricultural products. Falvey (1989) argue that the countries 
of regulations may play a crucial role as signalling the information for product quality. 
Thus, food manufacturers in the country with high food safety standards signal that their 
products have high quality. In this sense, higher SPS standards in the home country might 
be a source of competitive advantage. Hence, domestic SPS standards might have a 
positive impact on exports due to the signalling effect, and therefore, increase 
competitiveness of the firms facing tough food safety regulations. To be more specific, 
on one hand, SPS standards in the home country could have a positive impact on the 
exports of home country firms because of the signalling effect. On the other hand, SPS 
standards in the foreign country could have a negative effect on exports since SPS of 
foreign countries are considered as hurdles to overcome for exporters.  
 In this study, we investigate the impact of the signalling effect on firms facing 
high SPS in the home country since SPS regulations applied to domestic and foreign 
agricultural products, are the most dominant non-tariff barriers facing agricultural 
industries. Among the SPS safety regulations, we focus on the MRL standards due to the 
fact that MRL has a record of detailed dataset related to pesticides and pesticides residue 
levels that are very important factors raising food safety concerns. This paper chooses the 
U.S. for this study because it is one of the major agricultural exporting countries and the 
MRL database is constructed in a way that is consistent with the U.S. data. We use the 
Harmonized System (HS) 4-digit vegetable export data since the MRL regulates the 
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pesticide levels that are often used in vegetable production.1 This research investigates 
whether high MRL standards in the home country (U.S.) expedites its vegetable exports, 
using the MRL based protectionism index suggested by Li and Beghin (2014).2 
2.2 Literature Review 
The key issue in analyzing non-tariff barriers is the measurement problem. A 
tariff barrier is easily captured since it has a numerical value for every product. However, 
non-tariff barriers are hard to measure numerically. For this reason, empirical studies try 
to quantify non-tariff barriers in several ways. Nogues et al. (1986) measured NTMs by 
the concept of converge ratios (=
∑ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠
∑ 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠
). In other words, they tried to 
quantify NTMs as a similar concept and format with a tariff. Bradford (2001) calculated 
the markup price from NTMs using OECD data on specific product prices across 
countries. The markup price from NTMs indicates price increases due to NTMs. 
Andriamananjara et al. (2004) tried to measure the percentage change in price of 160 
products and services in 79 countries due to NTMs. To sum up, these papers calculate 
NTMs by price or value changes.  
Some studies have captured NTM effects on trade by quantity concepts (Harrigan, 
1993; Leamer, 1990). For example, Harrigan (1993) measured NTMs’ effect on import 
                                                          
1 This paper uses the HS chapters 6 to 14 (Section 2. Vegetable Products). 
2 We calculate the MRL protectionism index by modifying the one suggested by Li and Beghin (2014): 
𝑀𝑅𝐿 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
1
𝑇(𝑘)
(∑ exp (
𝑀𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑘𝑡(𝑘) − 𝑀𝑗𝑘𝑡(𝑘)
𝑀𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑘𝑡(𝑘)
))
𝑇(𝑘)
𝑡(𝑘)
 
where 𝑀𝑗𝑘𝑡(𝑘) is the maximum residue level of importer j, for good k, and harmful substance 𝑡(𝑘). 𝑀𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑘𝑡(𝑘) 
is the average maximum residue level for the same good with a harmful substance. 
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quantity using a monopolistic competition model. Mayer and Zignago (2005) captured 
NTMs’ effect as residuals in the gravity equation model. Some studies have also derived 
other methods to calculate trade restrictiveness indices by the NTMs. Looi Kee et al. 
(2009) estimated trade restrictiveness indices using the concept of NTBs ad-valorem 
equivalents compared to tariffs. Yue et al. (2006) measured the tariff equivalent of 
Japanese Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) regulations. 
The NTMs on agricultural products heavily depend on food safety standards 
(Disdier and Tongeren, 2010). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
WTO have reduced NTBs such as quotas (Sanders et al., 1996). However, the importance 
of food safety has increased due to increased GDP and food risks. For this reason, many 
studies on NTBs in the agricultural sector focus on the effects of food safety standards. 
Disdier et al. (2008) used dummy variables to indicate the existence of NTMs at the 6 
digit HS level. Xiong and Beghin (2011) used the numerical values of MRLs for 
groundnuts to analyze the effect of aflatoxin on African exports.3 However, these single 
disaggregated NTMs may have a problem with subjective selection bias (Li and Beghin, 
2014).4 Even if there is no selection bias, a single NTM may not represent all relevant 
NTMs for the product (Li and Beghin, 2014).  
To overcome this subjective selection bias problem, Rau et al. (2010) defined the 
heterogeneity index of trade (HIT). The HIT aggregates diverse regulations such as 
ordered, binary, or quantitative NTMs (Rau et al., 2010). However, the HIT does not give 
                                                          
3 Aflatoxin is a poisonous, cancer-causing chemical that is produced by particular mould. Its maximum 
residues are regulated in MRLs. 
4 The subjective selection bias comes from picking one NTM as representative of all NTMs. For this 
reason, just picking the aflatoxin tolerance and estimating the effect of aflatoxin may cause bias 
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information about relative strictness since the HIT is non-directional (Li and Beghin, 
2014). This index is calculated by bilateral dissimilarity; so that one does not know the 
relative rigidity based on their index (Li and Beghin, 2014). To know the directional 
rigorousness, the index must be calculated by the concept of relative rigidity instead of 
dissimilarity (Li and Beghin, 2014). In this sense, the HIT index is non-directional. To 
overcome this non-directional problem, Winchester, et al. (2012) suggested a directional 
HIT (DHIT).   
The DHIT captures the rigidity rather than dissimilarity between two countries 
using MRL data for agricultural products (Li and Beghin, 2014). Even though 
Winchester, et al. (2012) tried to capture rigidity using the DITT index, this index still 
has a problem in gauging the relative strictness or laxness of policies. For example, a 5 
ppm difference from 100 ppm is identical to a 5 ppm difference from 20 ppm with the 
DITT index (Li and Beghin, 2014). However, this 5 ppm difference could be more 
important from a base of 20 ppm than a base of 100 ppm. To avoid these problems, Li 
and Beghin (2014) developed the MRL protectionism index. Their index is based on the 
science-based standards of international MRL. They defined the importer’s MRL 
standard as strict if it is lower than the international MRL. 
Another key area of studies for NTMs is their effect on trade. In the agricultural 
sector, most papers focus on food safety regulation effects among NTMs barriers. It is 
well known that SPS standards can impede trade in agricultural and food products 
(Jaffee, 1999; Thilmany and Barrett, 1997; Unnevehr, 2000). Thornsbury et al. (1997) 
found that 90% of NTM effects on U.S. agricultural exports is explained by the SPS. 
Henson and Loader (2001) argued that the SPS standard is the major factor for 
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determining developing countries’ agricultural exports to developed countries. Based on 
a survey, they determined that developed countries have a higher SPS standard than 
developing countries and that these higher standards in developed countries are the major 
barrier to developing countries’ agricultural product exports to developed countries. 
Fontagné et al. (2005) showed that NTMs have a negative effect on fresh and processed 
food imports using the ad-valorem equivalents of NTMs and data at the 6-digit HS level. 
Disdier et al. (2008) also found that SPS and TBT measures have a negative effect on 
agricultural product trade using ad-valorem equivalents of the SPS and TBT regulations 
and OECD trade data. 
 Studies of NTMs’ effect on trade mainly focus on their role in impeding trade. 
However, NTMs may have an expediting role in trade for individual firms or nations. 
This expediting role may exist for the agricultural sector rather than other sectors since 
NTMs in the agricultural sector are heavily dependent on food safety regulations. 
Contrary to normal NTMs, food safety regulations are relevant to all firms in the country 
– importers, exporters, and domestic producers. Most NTMs, such as quotas, are 
regulated by importing countries and are only relevant to exporting countries. However, 
food safety regulations imposed by importing countries are effective for importing and 
exporting countries. If exporting countries have strict NTMs for food safety reasons, then 
exporting countries may have a competitive advantage, which is based on the signalling 
effect. The signalling effect mechanism is that consumers perceive the agricultural 
products from high food safety regulations as high quality products. In addition, 
exporting firms save costs through their accumulated export experiences (Schmeiser, 
2012). Lawless (2009) argued that experienced exporters have lower bureaucratic costs 
10 
 
connected with exporting, marketing, and distribution. Some studies also emphasize 
spillover effects on exporting firms from learning (Cassey and Schmeiser, 2012; Koenig, 
2009). 
2.3 Background on Maximum Residue Limits 
 Veterinary drugs are used in animals to deal with disease, keeping herds healthy, 
encouraging growth, enhancing meat quality, and increasing carcass yields. Using 
veterinary drugs can leave residues in food, which is termed as veterinary drug residue.5 
Residue is defined as an outcome from drugs or pesticides applied to animals or plants to 
produce food (FAO, 2006). This definition contrasts residues from contaminants, which 
Di Caracalla (1997) defines as “any biological or chemical agent, foreign matter or other 
substances not intentionally added to food that may compromise food safety or 
suitability”. Pesticide residue indicates the remaining pesticides in foods after the product 
is applied to a food crop (McNaught and Wilkinson, 1997).  
MRLs are the maximum concentrations of pesticide and veterinary drug residues 
allowed, as regulated by national or regional legislation (FAO, 2006). MRLs also are 
adaptable to animal feeds since feeds affect the residue levels in meats. The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC) sets the international guideline of MRLs. To set up the 
international criteria for MRLs, the CAC held two committees -- the Codex Committee 
on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) and the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary 
Drugs in Foods (CCRVDF). These committees came up with international MRLs based 
on the advice of scientific experts and the recommendations of risk assessors such as the 
                                                          
5 http://www.romerlabs.com/us/knowledge/veterinary-drug-residues/ 
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Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR) and the Joint 
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA). 
 The CAC has held 38 sessions, the 38th session was in July 2015, and has made a 
database for pesticides of the Codex Maximum Residue Limits (CMRL) and Veterinary 
Drugs MRLs (VMRL).6 CMRL contains five commodity categories of “Primary Animal 
Feed Commodities”, “Primary Food Commodities of Animal Origin”, “Primary Food 
Commodities of Plant Origin”, “Processed Foods of Animal Origin”, and “Processed 
Foods of Plant Origin”. CMRL are defined for 196 pesticides and VMRL are defined for 
74 drugs. 
2.4 MRL Protectionism Indices 
 This paper uses the 4-digit level of HTS in matching data for vegetables (see table 
2.1). This aggregation is beneficial for cross sectional econometric analysis with goods 
and countries (Li and Beghin, 2014). Using this aggregation method, we can suggest two 
aggregate scores for a country’s average protectionist score by commodity and country in 
terms of SPS regulations. This paper modifies the MRL protectionism indices of Li and 
Beghin (2014). Their MRL protectionism indices are based on the science-based 
international MRL (Codex). If an importer’s MRL is higher than the Codex level, then 
this importer is considered as an MRL-non-protectionist. The following index is the MRL 
protectionism index of Li and Beghin (2014): 
                                                          
6 http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/standards/pestres/en/ 
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𝑀𝑅𝐿 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
1
𝑇(𝑘)
(∑ exp (
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙,𝑘𝑡(𝑘) − 𝑀𝑗𝑘𝑡(𝑘)
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙,𝑘𝑡(𝑘)
))
𝑇(𝑘)
𝑡(𝑘)
 (1) 
where, 𝑀𝑗𝑘𝑡(𝑘) is the maximum residue level of importer j, for good k, and unsafe material 
𝑡(𝑘). 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙,𝑘𝑡(𝑘)  is the international maximum residue level for the identical good and 
unsafe material. 
 This protectionism index has a problem when the Codex MRL is missing for a 
product or pesticide, or when there are multiple MRLs. Li and Beghin (2014) focused on 
measuring the MRL protectionism index by country and product. However, we focus on 
the HTS 4-digit level for vegetables, which leads to an aggregation problem for each 
vegetable criteria. So, we modify Li and Beghin (2014)’s index using the average MRL. 
The following index is the modified index used in this study:  
 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑅𝐿 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
=
1
𝑇(𝑘)
(∑ exp (
𝑀𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑘𝑡(𝑘) − 𝑀𝑗𝑘𝑡(𝑘)
𝑀𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑘𝑡(𝑘)
))
𝑇(𝑘)
𝑡(𝑘)
 
(2) 
where, 𝑀𝑗𝑘𝑡(𝑘) is the maximum residue level of importer j, for good k, and unsafe material 
𝑡(𝑘). 𝑀𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑘𝑡(𝑘)  is the world average maximum residue level for the identical good and 
unsafe material. The modified MRL protectionism index has a slightly different meaning 
from the original MRL protectionism index. The original MRL index increases if a 
country has strict residue limits compared to the Codex. The modified MRL 
protectionism index increases if a country has strict residue limits compared to the world 
average.  
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This modified MRL protectionism index has several useful properties which are 
similar with Li and Beghin (2014)’s index. First, this index is unit-free since it is 
calculated in relative terms (percent). Second, the exponential function represents 
increasing marginal difficulty in meeting strict pesticide criteria. Third, the index is 
calculated by subtracting the importer’s MRL from the world average MRL. Fourth, this 
protectionism index has a lower and upper bound due to the fact that it is divided by the 
average world residue level. It is also monotonically non-decreasing in MRL 
protectionism for different countries (other things equal) since it is an exponential 
function.    
2.5 Data Description 
 This paper uses the Global MRL database (https://www.globalmrl.com/) accessed 
online in December 2015. This database contains pesticide MRLs, which are used since 
this paper focuses on vegetable exports. The vegetable pesticide database covers 534 
products, 294 pesticides, and 102 countries. Table 2.1 represents the number of pesticides 
which are included in the Global MRL database according to products (HS 2-digits 
level). The number of pesticides for the chapters 7 and 8, “Edible vegetables and certain 
roots and tubers” and “Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons”, is 381. Thus, 
the pesticides for chapter 7 and 8 occupy 71% of those included in the Global MRL 
database.  
 This Global MRL database has detailed information; however, Li and Beghin 
(2014) point out two drawbacks. First, the MRL dataset defines only chemical lists which 
are available to U.S. farmers. In other words, foreign pesticides or chemicals exist in this 
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database only if these pesticides or chemicals exist in the US. Thus, there is a possibility 
that foreign countries have a regulation for pesticides or chemicals which are not 
contained in the Global MRL dataset. However, this problem is minimized since the U.S. 
has comprehensive pesticides and chemicals (Li and Beghin, 2014). Furthermore, Li and 
Beghin (2014) tried to compare the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
data and the Homologa of the United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affair data. According to their comparison, the USDA has longer lists compared to 
the Homologa. In this sense, they argued that the problem of pesticide restrictions is 
controllable. 
Table 2.1 Vegetable Product Categories in the Pesticide Database (2015) 
HTS Chapter for Vegetables Counts 
Chapter 6: 
Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage 
26 
Chapter 7: 
Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 
187 
Chapter 8: 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons 
194 
Chapter 9: 
Coffee, tea, maté and spices 
38 
Chapter 10: 
Cereals 
15 
Chapter 11: 
Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten 
2 
Chapter 12: 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruits; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder 
66 
Chapter 13: 
Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts 
5 
Chapter 14: 
Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included  
1 
Total 534 
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 The second problem is non-established residues in the MRLs. Some non-
established MRLs exist in the international level (Codex) or the country level, so there 
are many missing values in the MRL database by country or Codex level. Even if the 
Global MRL database focuses on the US, the Global MRL has information of Codex and 
U.S. for pesticides. Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that both Codex and U.S. regulate 
most of pesticides in the world (Li and Beghin, 2014). Furthermore, it is hard to find 
banned pesticides sustained by other countries. However, there are probably missing data 
for some pesticides levels. The missing data problem has been reduced by USDA 
updating data in 2012 (Li and Beghin, 2014). 
Table 2.2 Top and Bottom 10 Countries Based on the MRL Protectionism Index 
Top 10 countries Bottom 10 countries 
Countries 
Protectionism 
Index 
GDP per 
capita 
(2014) 
Countries 
Protectionism 
Index 
GDP per 
capita (2014) 
1. Taiwan 1.843  1. Japan 0.720 $36,194.4 
2. Kazakhstan 1.676 $12,601.7 2. Bahrain 0.724 $24,855.2 
3. Finland 1.572 $49,823.7 3. Qatar 0.724 $96,732.4 
4. Denmark 1.571 $60,707.2 4. Oman 0.728 $19,309.6 
5. Malta 1.571  5. Kuwait 0.729 $43,593.7 
6. United   
    Kingdom 
1.571 $46,332.0 
6. United  
    States 
0.733 $54,629.5 
7. Greece 1.571 $21,498.4 7. Mexico 0.737 $10,325.6 
8. Slovenia 1.571 $23,999.1 8. Honduras 0.787 $2,434.8 
9. Czech  
    Republic 
1.570 $19,529.8 
9. Dominican  
    Republic 
0.849 $6,163.6 
10. Spain 1.570 $29,767.4 10. Hong Kong 0.895 $40,169.5 
Average 1.609 $33,032.4 Average 0.763 $33,440.8 
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 Table 2.2 shows the top (highest MRL index and protection) and bottom 10 
countries based on the MRL protectionism index. The top and bottom 10 countries are 
not highly correlated with GDP per capita, which is also shown in the table. It seems that 
even if high income people are concerned about food safety issues, some high GDP 
countries do not have strict MRL regulations. Furthermore, some lower GDP countries 
still set high MRL regulations for the health of their people. 
Table 2.3 Top and Bottom 10 Products Based on the MRL Protectionism Index 
Top 10 products 
HS 
code 
detail Index 
0906 cinnamon and cinnamon-tree flowers 1.658 
0908 nutmeg, mace and cardamoms 1.647 
0905 vanilla beans 1.635 
0909 seeds, anise, badian, fennel, coriander, cumin etc. 1.613 
0601 bulbs, tubers etc., chicory plants & roots naosoi 1.455 
1207 oil seeds & oleaginous fruits naosoi, broken or not 1.414 
1204 flaxseed (linseed), whether or not broken 1.412 
0705 lettuce and chicory, fresh or chilled 1.396 
1211 plants etc. for pharmacy, perfume, insecticides etc. 1.381 
0910 ginger, saffron, turmeric, thyme, bay leaves etc. 1.379 
 
Bottom 10 products 
HS 
code 
detail Index 
0806 grapes, fresh or dried 1.132 
1210 hop cones, fresh or dried, lupulin 1.135 
0814 peel, citrus or melon, fresh, frzn, dried, provsl pres 1.154 
0707 cucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled 1.156 
0809 apricots, cherries, peaches, plums & sloes, fresh 1.158 
0808 apples, pears and quinces, fresh 1.163 
0805 citrus fruit, fresh or dried 1.167 
1002 rye in the grain 1.172 
0702 tomatoes, fresh or chilled 1.176 
0901 coffee, coffee husks etc., substitutes with coffee 1.177 
 
 Table 2.3 represents the top and bottom 10 products based on the MRL 
protectionism index. Five products belonging to chapter 9, “COFFEE, TEA, MATE & 
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SPICES”, are among the top 10 products. Five products belonging to chapter 8, “ED. 
FRUITS & NUTS, PEEL OF CITRUS/MELONS”, are among the bottom 10 products. 
This result may be closely related with the pesticide residue testing report based on 
USDA data. The Environmental Working Group analyzed USDA pesticide residue data 
and they identified 12 dangerous fruits and vegetables which contain the highest pesticide 
residuals. According to their report in 2016, only 4 are vegetables among these 12 
(https://www.ewg.org/foodnews/list.php). This suggests that fruits are more dangerous 
with respect to pesticide residuals compared to vegetables. 
Table 2.4 Top 20 U.S. Vegetable Importing Countries (2015)  
Rank Market 
Export  
($1 million) 
Rank Market 
Export  
($1 million) 
1 China 264 11 Hong Kong 23 
2 Canada 137 12 Nigeria 21 
3 Mexico 108 13 Netherlands 19 
4 Japan 102 14 Turkey 18 
5 Korea 45 15 India 18 
6 Germany 32 16 Bangladesh 17 
7 Taiwan 31 17 Vietnam 16 
8 Spain 29 18 Italy 15 
9 Indonesia 25 19 Philippines 14 
10 Colombia 25 20 Saudi Arabia 13 
 
 Export data were collected from the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC). Table 2.4 shows the top 20 destinations for U.S vegetable exports. 
China is the leading destination; the GDP of China is the largest among U.S. importing 
countries in 2014 (World Bank Dataset). Canada, Mexico, and Korea rank 2nd, 3rd, and 
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5th, respectively, as destinations for U.S. vegetable imports. U.S. vegetable exports are 
likely stimulated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and U.S.-
Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA).7 
Data for GDP per capita came from the World Development Indicator of the 
World Bank in U.S. dollars. Data on distance, common official language, contiguity, and 
colonial experience were collected from Mayer and Zignago (2011). 
2.6 The Empirical Model 
The aim of our model is to measure the effect of the U.S. MRL protectionism 
index on U.S. vegetable exports. The gravity model was first introduced in physics and 
its basic elements have been used in empirically analyzing trade flows. This paper uses 
the gravity model, which has been shown to be powerful in explaining international trade 
flows (Cheng and Wall, 2005): 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘
= 𝑓(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑢𝑠, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 , 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠,𝑗, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑠,𝑗, 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑠,𝑗 , 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠,𝑗, 𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑢𝑠
𝑘 , 𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑗
𝑘) 
(3) 
where us is the exporting country (the United States), j is the importing country, and k is 
the product. Export is export value, GDP is gross domestic product per capita, Dis is the 
bilateral distance between the importer and the U.S., Com is a dummy variable to identify 
when there is a  common official primary language between the importer and the U.S., 
Col is a dummy variable to identify a colonial experience between the importing country 
and the U.S., Con is a dummy variable to identify importing countries that are contiguous 
                                                          
7 The NAFTA is the trilateral trade block in North America countries of U.S., Canada, and Mexico. 
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with the U.S., and MRL is the protectionism index calculated by the Maximum Residual 
Limits. 
To estimate equation (1), we take the log of both sides of the equation. However, 
U.S. exports have many zeros because there are many vegetable products not exported to 
some destinations. The log of zero is not defined. Furthermore, there tends to be 
heteroscedastic errors in exports, which leads to biased estimators due to Jensen’s 
inequality (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The multilevel model analysis is one of the 
methods used to solve this problem. The multilevel regression can model the 
heteroscedasticity problem directly by specifying cross-level interactions (Goldstein, 
2011; Western, 1998). Many zeros in export observations are related to sample selection 
bias. Sample selection problems happen when samples are only observable under certain 
conditions. In our case, exports are observable when exports are greater than zero. Let us 
consider a two-level hierarchy model to check for sample selection problems (Grilli and 
Rampichini, 2005). A bivariate linear model with two level intercepts can be represented 
as: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑆 = 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑆 𝜃𝑆 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑆 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑆  
𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑃 = 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑃 𝜃𝑃 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑃 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑃  
(4) 
where, i=1, 2, 3, …, I is the index of level two clusters (level 2); j=1, 2, 3, …, 𝑛𝑖 is the 
index of the elementary level (level 1); two variables, 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑆 and 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑃, are continuous response 
variables; S represents for a selection and P represents for a principal; 𝑧𝑖𝑗 are covariates 
at the level 1 or 2; 𝜃 are coefficients for these equations; 𝑢𝑖 are level 2 errors and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 are 
level 1 errors; These errors follow these assumptions: 
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[
𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑆
𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑆 ] ~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁 (0, [
𝛿𝑆
2            
𝛿𝑆𝑃      𝛿𝑃
2]) 
[
𝑢𝑖𝑗
𝑆
𝑢𝑖𝑗
𝑆 ] ~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁 (0, [
𝜏𝑆
2            
𝜏𝑆𝑃      𝜏𝑃
2]) 
According to Grilli and Rampichini (2005), the multilevel model estimators are 
unbiased if the sample selection depends on unobserved factors at the higher (cluster) 
level or at the lower (elementary) level. In other words, if 𝛿𝑆𝑃 = 𝜏𝑆𝑃 = 0, then the 
multilevel model estimators are unbiased. In our dataset, the number of zero dependent 
observations is 365 among 3,267 observations. Thus, we may assume that there are no 
sample selection problems because their numbers are small. The multilevel model can 
also consider the endogeneity problem in the higher level (level 2) using the cluster mean 
of the covariate (Grilli and Rampichini, 2006). 
Taking the log of both sides of equation (1) and capturing the cluster level (level-
2) endogeneity by rescaling MRL protectionism index of importing countries, this paper 
uses the following level-1 model: 
 ln (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ) = 𝜋𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 + 𝛽10ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑢𝑠) + 𝛽20ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗) + 𝛽30ln (𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑢𝑠
𝑘 )
+ 𝜋𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ln (𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑗
𝑘) + 𝛽50ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠,𝑗) + 𝛽60𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑠,𝑗
+ 𝛽70𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑠,𝑗 + 𝛽80𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠,𝑗 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘  
(5) 
where, k is the level 1 (products), j is the level 2 (importing countries), 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑗
𝑘 =
𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑗
𝑘 − 𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖𝑗 is the error term, 𝜋𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 = 𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
0 + 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 , and 𝜋𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 = 𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
4 + 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 . 
A single-equation expression of this model is derived by substituting 𝜋𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0  and 
𝜋𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4  into equation (4): 
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 ln (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ) = (𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
0 + 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 ) + 𝛽10ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑢𝑠) + 𝛽20ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗)
+ 𝛽30ln (𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑢𝑠
𝑘 ) + (𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
4 + 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 )ln (𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑗
𝑘)
+ 𝛽50ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠,𝑗) + 𝛽60𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑠,𝑗 + 𝛽70𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑠,𝑗
+ 𝛽80𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠,𝑗 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘  
(6) 
 We can rearrange equation (5) into the following equation by clustering the 
random and fixed parts: 
 ln (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ) = 𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
0 + 𝛽10ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑢𝑠) + 𝛽20ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗) + 𝛽30ln (𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑢𝑠
𝑘 )
+ 𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
4 ln (𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑗
𝑘) + 𝛽50ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠,𝑗) + 𝛽60𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑠,𝑗
+ 𝛽70𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑠,𝑗 + 𝛽80𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠,𝑗 + 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 + 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑗
𝑘 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘  
(7) 
where 𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
0  denotes the intercept; 𝛽10, 𝛽20, 𝛽30, 𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
4 , 𝛽50, 𝛽60, 𝛽70, and 𝛽80 represent 
the level-1 estimators; 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 , 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 , and 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘  show the error terms. To be specific, 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0  
indicates the level 2 error variance in the intercept and 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4  is the level 2 residual 
variance in the level-1 slope of 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝑗
𝑘. 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘  indicates errors in the entire model 
subtracting the level-2 variances. 
 One difference between the multilevel model and regression model is the error 
terms. Equation (6) has three error terms; however, the regression model has one error 
term since the regression model does not model the hierarchy. For this reason, there are 
assumptions concerning the disturbances. The following five assumptions are common in 
the multilevel model and are used in the present analysis: 
  E[𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 ] = 𝐸[𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ] = 𝐸[ 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘 ] = 0. There is no systematic parameter noise or 
level-1 noise in the model. 
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 Var[𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 ] = 𝜏0𝜏0, Var[𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ] =  𝜏4𝜏4, Var[ 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘 ] = 𝛿2. All disturbance terms of 
level-1 and level-2 have a constant variance. The multilevel model estimators are 
based on these variance components. 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 , 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ] = 𝜏0𝜏4. A correlation may exist between the level-2 disturbances 
on the intercepts and slopes. It is normal that the level-2 models with large slopes 
also have large intercepts or vice versa. Snijders and Bosker (1993) suggest a way 
to estimate this covariance term. 
  𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4  follow the normally distribution.   
 𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0 , 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘 ] = 𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 , 𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘 ] = 0. The errors in level-2 and level-1 are 
uncorrelated. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) argued that this assumption is 
normally necessary for an identified model. 
The level-2 disturbances can be derived from a bivariate normal distribution with 
a mean zero and a variance-covariance matrix, and the level-1 disturbance with a 
mean zero and the variance 𝛿2. 
 
[
𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
0
𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ]~N[(
0
0
) , (𝜏
0𝜏0   𝜏0𝜏4
𝜏4𝜏0   𝜏4𝜏4
)] 
 
and 
 
𝑢𝑠,𝑗
𝑘 ~𝑁(0, 𝛿2)  
(8) 
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For the robustness check, this paper estimates the multilevel model without 
centering in the cluster value, with centering in the cluster value, and with the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation. The PPML method is also one of way 
to deal with zero observations in the export data (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). 
2.7 Empirical Results 
 Table 2.5 shows the random effects in both multilevel models and the log 
likelihood ratio test (LR test) for the linear model. The null hypothesis for the LR test is 
that the single level regression is better than the multilevel model. Our results show that 
both multilevel models with centering and without centering reject the null hypothesis of 
the zero random effects at the 1% significance level. Thus, we can conclude that the 
multilevel specification is preferred to the single level regression model for this 
application. 
Table 2.5 Random Effects Test Results 
 
Multilevel Model Without 
Centering 
Multilevel Model With 
Centering 
Random Effect Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Constant 0.8712 0.0928 0.9286 0.0928 
Ln (U.S. MRL index) 0.6698 0.3746 0.7739 0.3393 
Correlation (Constant, Ln (U.S. 
MRL index)) 
-0.0261 0.3650 0.7917 0.4036 
Standard deviation (Residual) 2.4590 0.0338 2.4573 0.0337 
Log Likelihood Ratio Test for Multilevel Model vs Linear Regression 
Chi square 185.65 201.43 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 The estimation results for the U.S. MRL protectionism index’s impact on U.S. 
vegetable exports are represented in Table 2.6. Results are presented for three multilevel 
models: without centering, with centering, and PPML. The log of U.S. GDP is omitted 
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for all models because cross section data is used (U.S. GDP is redundant). The 
observation numbers in the multilevel and PPML models are different because of zero 
values. The PPML model can handle zeros while the other models cannot. 
The coefficients for log of distance are insignificant in all three models at the 10% 
significant level. These results contrast with most gravity model results such as 
Montobbio and Sterzi (2013), Khadaroo and Seetanah (2008), and Patuelli et al. (2015). 
These studies found that distance has a negative effect on exports. Theoretically, distance 
is considered as a trade barrier (Tinbergen, 1962). However, technology growth in 
transportation may reduce the distance barrier for U.S. vegetable exporters. The U.S. 
exports many vegetables to Canada and Mexico, which are both close, but they are also 
contiguous to the U.S. Other countries close to the U.S. are Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, but they do not import vegetables from the U.S. Thus, the contiguity 
variable might be picking up most of the distance effects. 
 The coefficients for contiguity are positive for all three models, which is expected 
since trade between such countries is much easier. Interestingly, the empirical literature 
shows ambiguous results. Burger, et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between the 
contiguity and exports. However, Cheng and Wall (2005) find a negative relationship 
between contiguity and exports. Batra (2006) finds that the contiguity effect on exports is 
insignificant. 
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Table 2.6 Estimation Results for MRL Protectionism Impact on Exports 
 
Multilevel 
Model Without 
Centering 
PPML 
Multilevel 
Model With 
Centering 
Ln (Importing Country’s GDP) 
0.126 
(0.0949) 
0.029 
(0.1118) 
0.083 
(0.0938) 
Ln (U.S. GDP) Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Ln (Importing Country’s MRL index) 
-1.094*** 
(0.2478) 
-0.870*** 
(0.2495) 
- 
Ln (Importing Country’s MRL 
Index)_Centered 
- - 
-1.287*** 
(0.2727) 
Ln (U.S. MRL index) 
1.619*** 
(0.2131) 
2.676*** 
(0.7166) 
1.580*** 
(0.2126) 
Ln (Distance) 
-0.002 
(0.2167) 
0.247 
(0.1767) 
-0.072 
(0.2158) 
Contiguity 
3.928*** 
(0.7819) 
2.329*** 
(0.3259) 
4.439*** 
(0.7517) 
Colony 
1.164** 
(0.5065) 
0.325 
(0.4166) 
0.960* 
(0.5056) 
Common Official Language 
0.040 
(0.2553) 
-0.324 
(0.2135) 
0.206 
(0.2559) 
Constant 
4.926** 
(2.2188) 
7.970*** 
(1.2745) 
5.649** 
(2.2142) 
Log Likelihood -6488.435 -1.651e+08 -6487.365 
Observations 2768 3115 2768 
Note: ***, **, * Significant 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. () is standard error 
 
 The colony experience has a positive effect on U.S. vegetable exports for both 
multilevel models; however, it is insignificant in the PPML model. These results are 
inconsistent with Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) that shows a negative relationship 
between the colony experience and exports. The U.S. has a colonial experience with 
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France, Philippines, Spain, and United Kingdom among the U.S. vegetable exporting 
partners.8 France, Spain, and the United Kingdom are members of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) and developed countries. Thus, these 
countries have enough income to purchase U.S. vegetables. 
 The common official language does not have a significant effect on U.S. 
vegetable exports. This result is not consistent with related literatures such as Gómez-
Herrera (2013), Montobbio and Sterzi (2013), Picci (2010), and Stack (2009). English is 
commonly used world-wide so having it as a mutual common official language may not 
be important (given the other variables in the model). 
 The coefficient for the importing country’s MRL protectionism index has a 
negative effect on U.S. vegetable exports. This result is consistent with the impeding role 
of NTMs on exports. For example, Fontagné, et al. (2005) showed that NTMs have a 
negative effect on fresh and processed food. Disdier, et al. (2008) also found that SPS and 
TBT measures have a negative effect on agricultural product trade. Lower MRL levels by 
importers make it more difficult for U.S. vegetable exporters to reach the market in a 
competitive fashion. 
 The focus of this paper is the effect of the U.S. MRL protectionism index on 
vegetable exports. All three models show that the U.S. MRL protectionism index has a 
positive effect on U.S. vegetable exports. This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
presented earlier; that the signalling effect of the home country’s strict food safety 
regulation may lead to increased exports. The results provide policy makers with insights 
                                                          
8 U.S. was a colony of France, Spain, and United Kingdom. And, Philippine was a colony of U.S. 
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into how strict food safety regulations of the home country can be considered as a 
catalyst for increasing competitiveness in the international markets.  
Table 2.7 shows the post-estimation results for the random effects model using 
the centered log of importing Country’s MRL protectionism index on the U.S. vegetable 
exports. The multilevel model specification in this paper defines the centered log of 
importing country’s MRL protectionism effect on U.S. vegetable exports as the fixed part 
(𝛽𝑢𝑠,0
4 ) and random part (𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ). The fixed part represents the average effect and the 
random part indicates the deviation from the average effect according to the importing 
country level (level 2). In other words, the random part represents errors in level 2 
effects. The post-estimation method allows us to calculate level 2 errors (𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ). If 
country A’s random error in level 2 (𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ) has a positive value, then country A has a 
higher centered log of importing country’s MRL protectionism effect on U.S. vegetable 
exports compared to the average importing country.  
Table 2.7 presents the top and bottom 10 countries for the random effect. Top 10 
countries indicate that the effect of importing country’s MRL protectionism index on 
U.S. vegetable exports is high compared to other countries and vice versa in the bottom 
10 countries. The average GDP of the Top 10 countries is higher than the bottom 10 
countries, however, the difference is only $888. Considering that income level is a key 
factor in the demand for higher food safety regulations, the small GDP difference 
between the top 10 and bottom 10 countries may indicate that political economic views 
are important. Götz et al. (2010) argued that governments increase non-tariff barriers 
such as SPS regulations to protect their producers. The government intention for 
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protecting their producers may be an important factor explaining the effects of the MRL 
protectionism index.  
Table 2.7 Top and Bottom 10 of Post-Estimation Results for Random Effects 
Top 10 countries 
Rank Country GDP Post-Estimator 
1 Iceland 52,004 -1.0952 
2 Paraguay 4,713 -1.0659 
3 Brunei 40,980 -0.9183 
4 Fiji 5,112 -0.8529 
5 Cyprus 27,194 -0.8426 
6 Slovenia 23,999 -0.8289 
7 Bahrain 24,855 -0.7222 
8 Austria 51,191 -0.6527 
9 Czech Republic 19,530 -0.6515 
10 Barbados 15,366 -0.6358 
Average 26,494 -0.8266 
Bottom 10 countries 
Rank Country GDP Post-Estimator 
1 Japan 36,194 2.0872 
2 China 7,590 1.5172 
3 Indonesia 3,492 1.1737 
4 Korea 27,970 1.0923 
5 Netherlands 52,172 0.8220 
6 Hong Kong 40,170 0.7221 
7 Turkey 10,515 0.6472 
8 Saudi Arabia 24,161 0.6314 
9 Thailand 5,977 0.5958 
10 Germany 47,822 0.5623 
Average 25,606 0.9851 
 2.8 Conclusions 
 In this paper, we investigate the signalling effect of exporters from countries that 
have high domestic levels of MRL standards. A priori, we expected that the home 
country’s strict food safety standards could provide a signalling effect that might enhance 
exports to other countries that have high standards. To be specific, we investigate the 
relationship between the U.S. MRL protectionism index and the U.S. vegetable exports. 
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The results show that the U.S. MRL protectionism index has a positive impact on the 
U.S. vegetable exports, indicating that the home country’s strict standards provide a 
signalling effect to firms in the home country exporting to foreign destinations with high 
food safety regulations. 
 The results of this paper also show that the importing countries’ MRL 
protectionism index has a negative effect on the U.S. vegetable exports. This is also 
reasonable since the MRL regulation is considered to be an NTB related to food safety. 
Previous literature on non-tariff barrier effects has also found a similar negative 
relationship with exports (Disdier and Marette, 2010). This negative relationship stems 
from the difficulty of meeting strict food safety regulations, such as the MRL. 
  Using the post-estimation method, we also represent the random effect in the 
centered log of importing Country’s MRL protectionism index (𝛿𝑢𝑠,𝑗
4 ) on U.S. vegetable 
exports. The random effect results indicate that the average GDP difference between top 
10 and bottom 10 countries is very small. This result gives us some insights into political 
economic views about non-tariff barriers. Political economists argue that governments 
use non-tariff barriers as a tool for protection of their domestic producers. Those 
arguments are compatible with our results. Our results show that strict food safety 
regulations are influenced by income levels; the income level difference in top and 
bottom 10 countries was $888. 
 These results have implications for firms and government policy makers. Firms 
may think that strict food safety regulations in the home country are just costs that must 
be incurred with no benefit. However, the home country’s strict regulation can be 
considered as an opportunity when firms sell their products in foreign markets that have 
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high food safety regulations. Firms can recoup some of their investment costs by 
exporting to other countries that value safer foods. These findings suggest that 
governments might wish to re-evaluate their food safety regulations. Governments that 
simply set food safety regulations for the health of their people underestimate the export 
benefits from stricter regulations. Stricter regulations can have a role in enhancing 
producers’ competitiveness by providing them the learning effect advantages as food 
regulations increase throughout the world. 
 This study only focuses on U.S. vegetable exports. To generalize the results, 
future studies are needed to consider other countries and other agricultural products. 
Furthermore, the empirical work can expand to incorporate other NTMs that influence 
trade and measuring their effects. The MRL protectionism index in this study only 
focuses on the pesticide residual level and this paper only uses data for 2015 in the 
analysis due to limitations in the MRL data. This analysis could include a time 
component as data is collected for the future years.  
 
 
  
31 
 
Chapter Three  
 
Political Determinants of SPS Notifications: Testing the Law of Constant Protection 
and Food Safety Demand 
3.1 Introduction 
Trade barriers are divided into tariff and non-tariff barriers. Recently, the 
importance of non-tariff barriers has been growing compared to tariff barriers, likely 
because there has been a steady decrease in tariff barriers through the various rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations (Dean et al., 2009). For example, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and 
regulations have resulted in the reduction of tariffs, which has increased competitiveness 
pressures on domestic producers. The worldwide trend of free trade agreements (FTA) 
and multinational trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), has also lowered tariff rates. These lower tariff barriers have increased the 
importance of NTBs, and for this reason, there is heightened interest in the research 
community to study NTBs. Most of the studies on NTBs, however, focus on measuring 
NTBs (Disdier and Tongeren, 2010; Looi Kee et al., 2009), or the effects of NTBs on 
trade flows (Andriamananjara et al., 2004; Dal Bianco et al., 2016). 
 In studies of NTB determinants, some political economists, such as Mansfield and 
Busch (1995), find a substitute relationship between tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers. 
They argue that countries want to protect their producers from reduced tariffs by 
increasing non-tariff barriers. This relationship is conceptualized by the law of constant 
protection (Bhagwati, 1989), where countries prefer to protect their domestic producers at 
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a constant rate; so if tariffs are lowered, non-tariff barriers must increase. However, there 
is a different political economy view related to the law of constant protection. Mansfield 
and Busch (1995) referenced studies for a complementary role of NTBs such as Ray 
(1981). They argue that countries mostly use NTBs in industries with high tariff barriers. 
For example, Ray (1989) showed that the U.S. had a tendency to protect industries which 
were least affected by the GATT compared to industries which were most affected by the 
GATT. 
 Empirical studies for the determinants of NTBs and the law of constant protection 
such as Mansfield and Busch (1995) and Ray (1989) focus on all industries using 4-digit 
or 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) level data. However, these studies use all industries 
data without considering the characteristic of each industry. In other words, these 
empirical researches focus on the NTBs that are adaptable to all industries. Each industry 
has different NTBs based on its unique characteristics compared to other industries. 
Industries in the agricultural and food sector, in particular, have different characteristics 
than other industries because NTBs for agricultural and food industries heavily depend on 
food safety regulations that have specific health-related targets. Normally, the purpose of 
NTBs, such as quotas, is solely protecting domestic industries and firms. Nevertheless, 
NTBs related to food safety regulations have the purpose of enhancing and protecting 
public health, as well as protecting home country industries. Thus, when we study the 
determination of NTBs and the law of constant protection in the agri-food sector, we 
have to consider the influence of increased food safety demand over time as technology 
becomes more available and as consumers become wealthier. 
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Empirical studies for determining NTBs or testing the law of constant protection, 
such as Lee and Swagel (1997) and Mansfield and Busch (1995), also include tariff rates 
and other political factors as independent variables. These studies assume that the 
relationship between independent variables (tariff rates, GDP per capita, and other 
political factors) and the dependent variable (NTBs) is linear. However, it is likely that 
their effects on NTBs vary based on the original tariff rates or GDP per capita levels. 
Two possible nonlinearities exist -- by tariff rates or GDP per capita. First, the effects of a 
tariff rate reduction on NTBs may be different according to the original tariff rate. For 
example, if the original protection level is high, then a politician may react strongly to a 
tariff reduction since the industry with high protection normally has a competitive 
disadvantage. Second, the effect of increasing wealth or GDP per capita on NTBs for 
food safety may be different according to the original GDP per capita level. For example, 
a wealthy country may experience fewer or less stringent NTBs for food safety since it 
may already have high food safety regulations. Thus, this paper tests nonlinearity in these 
relationships that may be from GDP per capita or tariff rates. The existence of 
nonlinearities will imply different policy effects as countries develop and liberalize trade. 
Among NTBs in the agricultural sector, this paper chooses SPS notifications by 
the WTO. First, there has been a large decrease in non-tariff (not related with food safety) 
and tariff barriers, which increased the importance of SPS barriers (Jongwanich, 2009). 
Second, SPS notifications cover a wide range of characteristics for food safety. The WTO 
requires that the application of SPS is based on scientific evidence and the SPS has a 
purpose to protect animal, plant, or human health based on scientific evidence (Liu and 
Yue, 2009). Last, SPS notifications in the WTO have a detailed dataset. The WTO 
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reports SPS notifications every year for each country, each product, and each notification 
reason (WTO-SPS Information Management System).  
This paper investigates the political determinants of SPS regulations as well as the 
impact of tariff reductions on SPS notifications (NTBs related with food safety issues) in 
the agricultural sector to test whether political economic views (such as the law of 
constant protection) are present. This study also explores the impact of GDP per capita on 
SPS notifications in the agricultural sector to test whether income derives food safety 
regulations. Furthermore, this paper tests for threshold nonlinearity in variables of tariff 
rate and GDP per capita using the method suggested by Hansen (2000). The estimation 
method for political determinants of SPS notifications is the fixed effect Tobit model 
because this paper’s dependent variable, the number of SPS notifications, has many zero 
values.9 
 The findings from this paper contribute to the existing empirical approaches about 
political determinants for non-tariff barriers that are available for the manufacturing 
sector. Yet this approach is different compared to the existing studies because it focuses 
on non-tariff barriers in the agricultural sector. A new explanatory variable compared to 
the existing studies is introduced, i.e., GDP per capita, since food safety demand 
influences non-tariff barriers in the agricultural sector. Moreover, this paper incorporates 
threshold non-linearity in the political determinants of non-tariff barriers. 
                                                          
9 This paper’s threshold non-linearity test shows that there is no threshold non-linearity for tariff rates and 
GDP per capita. 
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3.2 Literature Reviews 
Trade liberalization, the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, has a positive 
effect on productivity (Yu, 2015). According to Dornbusch (1980), country A has a 
competitive advantage over other countries if the country A has a lower production cost, 
which is related to productivity. In other words, if the country A has high productivity, 
then it has a competitive advantage. This competitive advantage can be linked with 
exports since firms will export when they have a competitive advantage (Salomon and 
Shaver, 2005). Exports can be a source of the economic development since exports are 
factors for increasing aggregate output (Awokuse, 2006). Thus, trade policies have an 
important role in exports and development. For this reason, figuring out the determinants 
of trade policies is important. 
Historically, traditional economists studied the determinants of trade policies such 
as trade barriers in terms of an economic and political view (Baldwin, 1982). An 
economic approach focuses on the trade liberalization effect. In other words, an economic 
view emphasizes the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers and their effect on exports 
or welfare. Political approaches are a common and reasonable way to study determinants 
of trade barriers since trade barriers exist even if there is a consensus that free trade is 
economically efficient (Lee and Swagel, 1997). 
Studies for determinants of trade policy mainly take a political economic 
approach, which can be divided into societal and statist approaches (Mansfield and 
Busch, 1995). The literature on societal approaches focuses on pressure groups that 
forces politicians to protect them by enacting policies that are friendly to their concerns. 
This is because a small group of stakeholders normally enjoys the benefits of trade 
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protection, while a larger number of customers typically shares costs of trade protection. 
Under this circumstance, a narrow group of stakeholders has a tendency to lobby 
politicians intensively while consumers do not (Lee and Swagel, 1997). Furthermore, it is 
well known that politicians make their choice based on their political benefits rather than 
voter’s economic interests (Biglaiser and Mezzetti, 1997). For example, Harrington 
(1993) argued that politicians employ policies to increase their probability for reelection. 
Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) also showed that the reelection plays a key role in 
politicians’ decision-making. Some studies for societal approaches are characterized as 
endogenous protection (Carter et al., 1990; Nelson, 1988; Rodrik, 1994). However, 
societal approaches are criticized because they do not recognize the importance of large 
states (or industries) on trade policy (Goldstein, 1988; Gourevitch, 1986). It is argued that 
societal approaches underestimate the power of these important groups on trade 
liberalization. 
 Statist approaches focus on how politicians make trade policy, where societal 
pressures are constant (Mansfield and Busch, 1995). In other words, statist approaches 
focus on the effects of policies on the national interest rather than pressure groups. Two 
factors, relative size and domestic institutions, are represented as statist approach 
variables (Mansfield and Busch, 1995). First, the state’s economic size dominates its 
national interest in terms of trade policy. Large states (industries) have disproportionately 
large market power compared to small states (industries) (Dornbusch, 1993). Thus, large 
states or industries have more power to influence trade policy compared to small states or 
industries. In other words, the trade policy tends to benefit large states or industries, 
which indicates that national interests are satisfied compared to the trade policy for small 
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states of industries. The second factor is domestic institutions. Mansfield and Busch 
(1995) cited the study of Rogowski (1987) for the importance of regional institutions. 
Rogowski (1987) insists that a large number of domestic institutions are helpful to make 
trade policy for a whole state or industry rather than small members in a state or industry. 
A study specifically addresses the political relationship between tariff and non-
tariff barriers. Bhagwati (1989) suggests the “law of constant protection”, which indicates 
that tariff reductions cause increases in non-tariff barriers. In other words, his argument 
points to a displacement effect between tariff and non-tariff barrier. However, there is 
also a strain of the political economic approach that focuses on the complementary 
relationship between tariff and non-tariff barriers (Mansfield and Busch, 1995). For 
example, Ray (1989) found that U.S. industries least affected by the General Agreement 
on Tariff Trade (GATT) have higher NTBs. In other words, the complementary 
relationship between tariff and non-tariff barriers indicates that governments may set high 
NTBs for industries with high tariff rates. There are many theoretical studies for the 
relationship between tariff reductions and NTBs, but few empirical studies (Aisbett and 
Pearson, 2012). Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) argue that a decrease in tariff barriers 
leads to an increase in the likelihood and number of anti-dumping petitions. Aisbett and 
Pearson (2012) also show that tariff reductions increase the SPS notification numbers. 
There are several empirical studies dealing with the political determinants of trade 
barriers. Considering the societal approaches and the effects of trade barriers on trade 
flows, there is a need to take into account the simultaneous determination process 
between trade barriers and trade. Interest groups have an incentive to lobby for their 
protection if there is an increase in import competition from trade liberalization (Baldwin, 
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1985; Magee et al., 1989). At the same time, trade barriers, which come from lobbying 
activities of interest groups, affect trade flows. Thus, some studies on the determinants of 
trade barriers take into account the simultaneous relationship between trade barriers and 
trade; incorporating the possibility that trade barriers can affect trade and trade can affect 
trade barriers. Ray (1981) investigated the determinants of imports and trade barriers with 
a simultaneous relationship using data from U.S. manufacturing industries in 1970. He 
showed that industrial characteristics such as labor intensity and capital/labor ratio have a 
different effect on tariff and non-tariff barriers when allowing for a simultaneous 
relationship between imports and trade barriers. Trefler (1993) also studied the 
determinants of U.S. trade and NTBs using a simultaneous equation model.  
Some studies for the determinants of trade barriers do not consider the 
simultaneous relationship between trade barrier and trade. Ray and Marvel (1984) 
estimated the determinants of U.S. tariffs and NTBs separately using four-digit 
manufacturing data. Lee and Swagel (1997) also investigated the determinants of non-
tariff barriers using disaggregated data from 41 countries in 1988. Jongwanich and 
Kohpaiboon (2007) investigated the determinants of protection in Thai manufacturing 
industries considering supply and demand factors. 
 Most studies on the determinants of NTBs are based on political economy and the 
relationship between tariff reductions and NTBs are not focused on the agricultural 
sector. As Aisbett and Pearson (2012) showed, non-tariff barriers in agricultural sectors 
have different characteristics than manufacturing sectors since non-tariff barriers in 
agriculture often depend on food safety issues. For example, SPS regulations are used for 
protecting human, plant, and animal health (Aisbett and Pearson, 2012). For this reason, 
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there is a need for studying political determinants of non-tariff barriers in agricultural 
industries considering the relationship between tariff reductions and non-tariff barriers. 
Even though Aisbett and Pearson (2012) focused on SPS notification numbers and 
agricultural non-tariff barriers, they did not consider political economy factors. 
Furthermore, they did not allow for non-linearity in the determinants of SPS notifications. 
Finally, they did not account for problems associated with zero observations in the 
dependent variable. For this reason, this paper investigates non-linearity in political 
determinants of SPS notifications. 
3.3. Model of Political Determinants of Non-Tariff Barriers 
 Societal and statist approaches are prevalent in studies on the determinants of 
non-tariff barriers (Mansfield and Busch, 1995). Societal approaches focus on the role of 
pressure groups on political choices. However, societal approaches are criticized by 
statist approaches due to the underestimation problem. The statists argue that societal 
approaches underestimate the effects of state interests and domestic institutions 
(Goldstein, 1988). Mansfield and Busch (1995) also argue that the statist approach has 
little support from quantitative evidence. They suggest that societal and statist approaches 
are considered as complementary. Thus, this paper combines societal and statist 
approaches to the empirical model. 
 Following the societal approach, this paper uses unemployment and exchange rate 
as explanatory variables. The societal approach argues that competition between pressure 
groups and non-state players determines a trade policy. In other words, the effect of 
pressure groups on politicians or policy makers is the key factor for a determination of 
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trade policy. Thus, we can expect that macroeconomic fluctuations are important factors 
for the societal approach since pressure groups have an incentive to force politicians to 
change trade policy for dealing with macroeconomic fluctuations. This procedure for the 
determination of trade policy is called endogenous protection (Nelson, 1988; Ray, 1989; 
Rodrik, 1994). Fluctuations in macroeconomic variables affect trade policies as shown in 
studies such as Baldwin (1989), Bergsten and Cline (1983), and Salvatore (1993). Among 
macroeconomic variables, the unemployment and exchange rate are the key variables for 
the societal approach (Mansfield and Busch, 1995; Ruggie, 1982). A higher 
unemployment rate leads to an increase in import restrictions since the unemployment 
rate imposes costs from job losses. Fluctuations in the exchange rate also lead to 
increased protection since exchange rate variations cause concerns to firms (Dornbusch 
and Frankel, 1987). 
Statist approaches focus on the role of national interests and domestic institutions 
on the determination process of trade policy. Mansfield and Busch (1995) argued that an 
industry’s relative size, such as the ratio of that industry’s imports to total imports and the 
ratio of that industry’s GDP to global GDP, represents the national interest. Therefore, 
national interest can be different across states, regions, or industries. Larger states, 
regions, or industries may have a disproportionately larger market power (Dornbusch, 
1993). Governing states, regions, or industries act in an economically predatory manner 
for a trade protection (Gilpin, 2016).10 For example, the manufacturing industry in Korea 
pushes politicians to enact trade policy that emphasizes the important role of the 
manufacturing sector, which leads to trade policies that sacrifice the agricultural industry 
                                                          
10 In our model, we capture governing industries using the GDP of agriculture relative to the total economy. 
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in Korea.11 It is well shown in the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement which is beneficial 
to manufacturing sectors but harmful to agricultural sectors (Cooper et al., 2012). 
Large states or industries have a high degree of institutional insulation and 
autonomy, which means that large states or industries may have an organized institution 
to force policy makers to enact favorable policies for them.12 Thus, politicians have an 
incentive to impose NTBs in states or industries of well-organized domestic institutions 
(Mansfield and Busch, 1995). Rogowski (1987) captures well-organized domestic 
institutions in his analysis by the number of domestic institutions. However, it is hard to 
gather useful data for domestic institutions. For this reason, this paper does not include 
variables for domestic institutions. Considering the high correlation between well-
organized (and large) domestic institutions and larger states, using the relative state size 
may capture the effects of domestic institutions also. 
 This paper also considers the substitution effect between tariff and non-tariff 
barriers by adding the tariff rate as an independent variable. The tariff rate is assumed as 
exogenous from NTBs, as assumed by Lee and Swagel (1997), because tariff rates for 
many nations have decreased due to the free trade trend within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and other multinational agreements. Furthermore, Ray (1981) found 
that NTBs are not affected by tariffs.   
                                                          
11 According the World Bank dataset in 2014, the GDP share of agriculture in Korea is 2.4% and the GDP 
share of manufacturing in Korea is 38.7%. 
12 In Korea’s case, manufacturing companies such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG are part of the Federation 
of Korean Industries (FKI), which has pushed policy makers since 1961 
(http://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=2837041&cid=50867&categoryId=50867). FKI’s purpose is 
to propose policies to the government for their benefits 
(http://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=2837041&cid=50867&categoryId=50867). 
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 Finally, this study considers food safety demand by including GDP per capita, 
since SPS notifications reflect the demand for higher food safety regulations. A product 
with higher food safety standards may be considered a higher quality product compared 
to a product with lower food safety standards. Consumption of high quality products 
increases consumer satisfaction (Juran, 1999). Thus, GDP per capita may be a proxy 
variable for food safety demand since high-income people are more sensitive to quality 
issues compared to low income people. 
Table 3.1 Independent Variable Specification 
Independent Variable Role 
Unemployment Rate Societal Approach 
Exchange Rate Societal Approach 
National Interest 
(Relative Size) 
Statist Approach 
Tariff Rate 
Capture the Substitution Effect Between 
Tariff and SPS  
GDP per capita 
Capture the Demand for Products with 
High Food Safety Regulations 
 
 Table 3.1 presents the independent variables in the specification. The 
unemployment and exchange rate represent the societal approach. The relative size 
(national interest) indicates the statist approach. The tariff rate captures the substitution 
effect between tariff and SPS notifications. GDP per capita captures the demand for 
products with high food safety regulations. 
 In summary, the model specification for this paper is: 
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 𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 
(9) 
 
where i is country, t is year, SPS is SPS notification numbers, Unemployment Rate is the 
unemployment rate in the agricultural sectors, Exchange Rate is the official exchange 
rate, Relative Size is the percentage of GDP from the agricultural sectors. Tariff is the 
tariff rate for agricultural sectors, and GDP is GDP per capita.  
3.4 Data Description 
 A new generation of regional trade agreements has appeared in the 21st century 
that lower tariff barriers (Friel et al., 2013). For this reason, this paper focuses on the 
period 2000 to 2014. Among non-tariff barriers, this paper chooses SPS notifications 
mainly because we want to focus on agricultural sectors, which have different 
characteristics compared to manufacturing sectors. First, non-tariff barriers in agricultural 
sectors are heavily dependent on food safety regulations. Jongwanich (2009) argues that 
the importance of SPS has an increasing trend in agricultural sectors since there is a large 
decrease in tariff and non-tariff (not related with food safety) barriers. Second, SPS 
notifications, which are notified by each country to WTO, are based on scientific 
evidence. Last, the WTO has a detailed dataset for SPS notifications which includes year, 
product, and notification reason for each (WTO SPS Information Management System). 
Data on SPS notifications in WTO have many zeros, so this paper uses the Tobit model 
to handle the zeros in the dependent variable. After the left censoring (based on 0) by the 
Tobit model, we have 103 countries among the original 218 countries. Data on SPS 
notifications is gathered from the integrated trade intelligence portal of the WTO. 
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We use the simple tariff rate from the trade analysis information system of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). As seen from table 
3.2, there is an increasing trend in SPS notifications, while there is a decreasing trend in 
tariff rates. These trends may represent a substitute relationship between tariff and non-
tariff barriers. 
Table 3.2 SPS Notifications and Tariff Rates 2000 to 2014 
Year 
The average of SPS 
notifications among 
countries 
The sum of SPS 
notifications among 
countries 
The simple tariff 
mean among 
countries 
2000 0.78 174 21.19 
2001 1.70 377 19.00 
2002 1.53 340 18.50 
2003 1.62 360 19.52 
2004 1.47 327 17.01 
2005 1.41 313 17.53 
2006 1.82 403 17.74 
2007 2.40 532 18.32 
2008 3.71 823 17.39 
2009 2.99 663 17.39 
2010 3.62 803 16.70 
2011 3.45 766 16.27 
2012 2.98 661 15.12 
2013 3.32 738 15.93 
2014 4.21 934 15.02 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the WTO database 
 
 Data on GDP per capita comes from the World Bank database. As shown in 
Figure 3.1, the average GDP per capita among the 218 countries has an increasing trend. 
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This trend shows that there is a tendency of increasing demand for food safety over time 
(or as GDP per capita increases). 
 
Figure 3.1 The average GDP per capita among 218 countries 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the World Bank Database 
  
 The relative size of agricultural sector is defined in this paper by agricultural 
value added per worker and GDP per capita from the World Bank Database. The relative 
size of the agricultural sector is calculated by the following equation: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡
= 1 −
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡
 
 
(2) 
 
 The agricultural unemployment rate is derived from data on the total labor force, 
unemployment total (%), employment in agricultural sectors (%), and rural population 
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datafrom the World Bank Data base. The calculation procedure is composed following 
three steps of equations. 
 First Step 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
= 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × (1
− 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 (%)𝑖𝑡) 
 
Second Step 
 
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
= 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
× 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 (%)𝑖𝑡 
Third Step 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡
= 1 −
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
 
(3) 
 
3.5 Testing the Threshold Non-linearity 
 Panel data often have a heterogeneity problem due to the fact that the structural 
relationships may differ according to each industry or individual (Wang, 2015). However, 
the traditional models for fixed or random effects only consider intercept heterogeneity 
(Wang, 2015). There are ways of capturing slope heterogeneity using the threshold 
nonlinearity concept. However, most papers focus on time-series data, such as Tong 
(2012) who deals with nonlinear time series data using threshold autoregressive model. 
Hansen (2000) suggests a simple way to find the threshold value (slope and intercept 
heterogeneity) in the normal regression form. For this reason, this paper follows the 
Hansen (2000) method for estimating the threshold values and testing for threshold non-
linearity. The basic threshold model is: 
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 𝑦𝑖 = 𝜃1
′ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖    𝑖𝑓  𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝛾 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜃2
′ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖    𝑖𝑓  𝑞𝑖 > 𝛾 
 
(4) 
where 𝑞𝑖 is the threshold variable, 𝑦𝑖 is dependent variable, 𝑥𝑖 is an independent variable 
matrix, 𝑒𝑖 is the error term, and 𝛾 is a threshold value which divides the sample into two. 
The two groups are called “regimes”. 
 Combining the equations in (4), Hansen (2000) defines a dummy variable 
𝑑𝑖(𝛾) = 1, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 {𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝛾}. He also assumes that 𝑥𝑖(𝛾) = 𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑖(𝛾). 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝜃
′𝑥𝑖 + 𝛿𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑖(𝛾) + 𝑒𝑖 (5) 
 
where 𝜃 = 𝜃2.
13 
 To put the model in matrix notation, Hansen (2000) defines the n×1 vectors Y 
and e by stacking variables 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖. He also defines X and 𝑋𝛾 as n × 𝑚 vectors by 
stacking vectors 𝑥𝑖
′ and 𝑥𝑖(𝛾)′. 
 𝑌 = 𝑋𝜃 + 𝑋𝛾𝛿𝑛 + 𝑒 (6) 
  
 One can estimate the parameters (𝜃, 𝛿𝑛, 𝛾) by minimizing the following least 
square (LS): 
 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑛(𝜃, 𝛿, 𝛾) = (𝑌 − 𝑋𝜃 − 𝑋𝛾𝛿𝑛)′(𝑌 − 𝑋𝜃 − 𝑋𝛾𝛿𝑛) (7) 
  
 Least squares estimators 𝜃, 𝛿, 𝛾 jointly minimize the above sum of square errors. 
Hansen (2000) suggested the easiest method to obtain the LS estimators is by using the 
                                                          
13𝜃2 exists in equation (4). 
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concentrated sum of squared errors function. We can rewrite equation (7) conditional on 
𝛾, which allows us to regress Y on 𝑋𝛾
∗ = [𝑋𝑋𝛾], and obtain the conditional OLS 
estimators 𝜃(𝛾)̂ and 𝛿(𝛾)̂. 
 𝑆𝑛(𝛾) = 𝑆𝑛(𝜃(𝛾)̂, 𝛿(𝛾)̂, 𝛾) = 𝑌
′𝑌 − 𝑌′𝑋𝛾
∗(𝑋𝛾
∗′𝑋𝛾
∗)−1𝑋𝛾
∗′𝑌 (8) 
 
where 𝛾 minimizes the concentrated sum of squared errors function 𝑆𝑛(𝛾). 
 After this estimation, one tests the null hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝑁𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑)since there 
needs to be a statistical check for the threshold point. In our case, the threshold variables 
(q) are GDP per capita and tariff rate. The following equations (9) represent this paper’s 
threshold model. 
 𝐿𝑛(1 + 𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0
1 + 𝛽1
1𝐿𝑛(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽2
1𝐿𝑛(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3
1𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽4
1𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5
1𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
1      𝑖𝑓  𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾 
 
𝐿𝑛(1 + 𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0
2 + 𝛽1
2𝐿𝑛(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽2
2𝐿𝑛(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3
2𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽4
2𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5
2𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
2      𝑖𝑓  𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾 
(9) 
 
where, q is GDP per capita or tariff rate.   
 This paper has two threshold non-linearity hypothesis tests. The first null 
hypothesis is “There is no threshold relationship based on GDP per capita”. We expect 
that there is a threshold non-linearity based on GDP per capita. It is believed that GDP 
per capita has an effect on SPS notification variations, which indicates that food safety 
demand is expected to differ according to income level (GDP per capita). If we reject this 
hypothesis, we can argue that countries with a GDP per capita above a particular level 
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may be more sensitive to food safety considerations compared to countries with GDP per 
capita below that level.  
 The second null hypothesis is “There is no threshold non-linear relationship based 
on tariff rates”. We expect that there is a threshold non-linearity based on tariff levels. It 
is believed that the original protection level regulated by tariff rates is an important factor 
with respect to SPS notifications. We believe there is a substitute relationship between 
tariff and SPS notifications, but this relationship may be different according to the 
original tariff level. If we find threshold non-linearity based on tariff rates, we can argue 
that politicians may consider a tariff reduction effect on industries differently depending 
on whether the tariff was high or low.  
3.6. Empirical Model 
 This paper uses the Tobit method to estimate the model because it can deal with 
many zeros in the dependent variable (Melitz, 2003). The fixed effects Tobit model is 
used since the dataset is panel. The same cross section data at different points in time 
(panel data) may bring about unobserved effects (Wooldridge, 2010). These effects may 
be related to the omitted variables, which lead to endogeneity problems. Furthermore, 
these unobserved effects may represent unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010). 
To solve this omitted variable problem and unobserved heterogeneity from unobserved 
effects, this paper uses the fixed effect Tobit model.14 The following equation is a 
logarithmic functional form of equation (1). 
                                                          
14 The basic form of unobserved effects model is represented as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,   𝑡 = 1,2, . … . . , 𝑇 
where, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a 1×K vector, i is individual, t is time, c is an unobservable factor, and u is a random error. 
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 𝐿𝑛(1 + 𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
∗ ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = {
𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
0,            𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
(10) 
 
where, i is country, t is year, SPS is the number of SPS notifications, Unemployment Rate 
is the unemployment rate in the agricultural sectors, Exchange Rate is the official 
exchange rate, Relative Size is the relative GDP of agricultural sectors, Tariff is the tariff 
rate for agricultural sectors, GDP is GDP per capita, 𝑢𝑖 is a fixed effects term, and 
𝑒𝑖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝛿
2). 
 The model is also estimated with the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
(PPML) method to provide a robustness test. This method, suggested by Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006), can deal with many zeros in the dependent variable. Silva and Tenreyro 
(2011) also showed that the PPML estimators perform well even if the dataset has a large 
number of zeros. Another simple way to deal with many zeros in the dependent variable 
is adding 1 to the dependent variable (Baldwin and Nino, 2006; Gómez-Herrera, 2013). 
However, this method has a problem with biased coefficients (Baldwin and Nino, 2006; 
Bergijk and Oldersma, 1990; Wang and Winters, 1992). Nonetheless, this paper also 
provides results from the fixed effects panel model estimator when adding 1 to the 
dependent variable. This also provides a robustness check. 
3.7. Results 
 Table 3.3 represents the test results of the null hypothesis that there is no 
threshold against the alternative hypothesis that there is a threshold on variable effects. 
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The null hypothesis that there is no threshold cannot be rejected for both threshold 
variables (GDP per capita and tariff rate) at the 5% significance level. These results have 
two implications. First, there is no difference between high and low income countries in 
terms of their sensitivity for food safety demand, since there is no threshold based on 
GDP per capita. The food safety demand is closely related with quality demand for food 
since food safety is one of components for quality of food products. Thus, our result is 
consistent with Seok et al. (2016) that showed there is no difference in quality demand 
between OECD and non-OECD countries. Since there is no difference in food safety 
demand according to the income level, quality competition on food safety demand may 
be more important than price competition. At a minimum, low and high income countries 
do not have different preferences for food safety. 
Table 3.3 Test of Null of No Threshold against Alternative of Threshold 
Threshold Variables GDP per capita Tariff Rate 
Number of Bootstrap Replications 2000 2000 
Trimming Percentage 0.15 0.15 
Threshold Estimate 393.02 10.84 
Bootstrap P-Value 1 1 
 
Second, our threshold test result for the tariff rate indicates that the effects of 
tariff level on non-tariff barriers do not differ between high and low tariff situations. This 
result implies that SPS notifications are determined from a political perspective rather 
than an economic perspective. Less competitive industries have a higher chance to be 
sacrificed by a tariff reduction compared to more competitive industries, due to import 
competition. With an economic view, each government has a different level of non-tariff 
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barriers depending on the tariff reductions by industry. However, our result shows that 
each government sets the same increasing rate in non-tariff barriers to deal with a tariff 
reduction. This implies that the government’s choice for non-tariff barriers is determined 
by politics rather than economics. 
Table 3.4 The Results of Three Models of SPS Notifications 
 
Panel Fixed 
Effect Model 
PPML Model 
Fixed Effect Tobit 
Model 
Ln(Tariff Rate) 
0.031 
(0.0826) 
-0.121 
(0.1033) 
0.122 
(0.1314) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 
0.999*** 
(0.1836) 
1.602*** 
(0.2690) 
1.553*** 
(0.3133) 
Ln(Unemployment 
Rate) 
0.0274 
(0.1554) 
-0.493 
(0.6529) 
0.107 
(0.2147) 
Ln(Exchange Rate) 
0.524*** 
(0.1673) 
0.796** 
(0.3768) 
0.957*** 
(0.2787) 
Ln(Relative Size) 
0.626*** 
(0.2390) 
0.830** 
(0.3357) 
0.855** 
(0.4220) 
Constant 
-9.017*** 
(1.6090) 
-16.184** 
(2.8273) 
670.491 
(400697.2) 
Log Likelihood - -2679.92 -769.26 
R-square 0.692 0.526 - 
Observations 790 665 790 
Censored 
Observations 
- - 378 
Dropped Observations - 125 - 
Note: ***, **, * Significant 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. () is standard error 
 The estimation result for tariff barrier effects on SPS notifications in the 
agricultural sector are presented in Table 3.4. Results are presented for the Panel Fixed 
Effects model, PPML model, and Fixed Effects Tobit model. The Fixed Effects Tobit 
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model shows that 378 observations are censored due to zeros in SPS notifications. The 
signs of coefficients of each independent variable are the same for all estimation 
techniques. Furthermore, the coefficients for each independent variable are similar in 
magnitude. 
 According to the Fixed Effects Tobit model, the log of tariff rate has no 
significant effect on the expected log of SPS notifications for the agricultural sector at the 
10% significance level. This result does not match the expectations of political 
economists who argue that tariff and non-tariff barriers have a substitute relationship. 
Furthermore, this result also contradicts the law of constant protection espoused by 
Bhagwati (1989). There may exist two possible explanations for this result. First, other 
types of non-tariff barriers exist, such as Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), in 
agricultural sectors. This study uses SPS notifications to measure non-tariff barriers in 
agricultural sectors; however, SPS notifications do not represent all non-tariff barriers in 
agricultural industries. Thus, this analysis might miss the hypothesized relationship 
between tariff and non-tariff barriers from political economists and Bhagwati (1989). 
Second, this result may be explained by special characteristics of the agricultural sector. 
The agricultural industry has different non-tariff barriers compared to the manufacturing 
industry. For example, a minimum market-access agreement was in place for the Korean 
rice market until 2014. Under this circumstance, the government does not have an 
incentive to increase SPS regulations to deal with the reduction of tariff barriers since the 
Korea rice market already is protected through minimum market access provisions. 
 The log of GDP per capita has a positive effect on the expected log of SPS 
notifications in agricultural sectors for all three models, as expected. GDP per capita has 
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a positive effect on SPS notifications because high-income people are more sensitive to 
food safety issues compared to low income people. This result suggests that NTBs in 
agricultural sectors are likely related to food safety issues and the demand for safer food. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The Unemployment Rate in Agricultural Sectors (World Average) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the World Bank Database 
 
 This paper has two societal variables, the log of the unemployment rate and 
exchange rate. The log of unemployment rate does not have a significant effect on SPS 
notifications. This result is not matched with the societal approach and the study of 
Mansfield and Busch (1995). It might be explained by the characteristics for agricultural 
industries. First, agricultural sectors have small variations in the unemployment rate, 
shown in the figure 3.2. Thus, the unemployment effect on SPS notifications may be 
limited. Second, agricultural employment is small and has a decreasing trend (Figure 
3.3). Thus, employment in agriculture might not be important enough to warrant NTBs. 
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Figure 3.3 The Employment in Agriculture 
Source: WTO database 
 
The log of exchange rate has a positive effect on SPS notifications. This result 
supports the societal approach since appreciated currencies are highly connected to the 
occurrence of SPS notifications. This result is also supported by Mansfield and Busch 
(1995) since their result shows a positive and statistically significant effect of exchange 
rate on non-tariff barriers. According to their argument, exports and import-competing 
industries are endangered by an appreciated currency. Thus, there is a need to protect the 
threatened industries. 
 This paper also includes the relative size of the agricultural sector, for the statist 
approach. The log of relative size of agricultural industries has a positive effect on SPS 
notifications. This result supports the statist approaches and is supported by Mansfield 
and Busch (1995).This result indicates that a country with higher GDP in the agricultural 
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sector has more political power to push politicians compared to a country with lower 
GDP in the agricultural sector. This result also shows that even if an industry’s GDP is 
small, it will have a power to push politicians.  
3.8. Conclusions 
 This paper investigates the political determinants of SPS notifications using a 
fixed effect Tobit model. Furthermore, this paper tests threshold nonlinearity with respect 
to GDP per capita and tariff rate. The threshold non-linear test results show that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a linear relationship. This result provides two 
insights. First, food safety demand does not differ according to a country’s income (no 
threshold relationship based on GDP per capita), thus there is a need to focus on a quality 
competition in terms of food safety among all countries. Food safety concerns will 
continue to heighten and influence SPS notifications as all countries develop. Firms need 
to find ways for enhancing agricultural products’ quality based on food safety. One way 
to enhance the quality in agricultural sectors might be by using private party certification. 
Private certifications for agricultural products quality are usually stricter than 
governments food safety standards (Caswell and Johnson, 1991; Henson and Reardon, 
2005). 
Second, there is no difference in the effect of tariff rate on SPS notifications by 
tariff level. This result shows that a political view better explains the determination of 
SPS notifications compared to an economic view. Based on an economic view, a 
government needs to set higher non-tariff barriers in less competitive industries compared 
to industries that are more competitive. When trade liberalization increases competition 
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for less competitive industries, these industries suffer more. However, our result indicates 
that the tariff reduction effect on SPS notifications is not different between high and low 
competitive industries. This implies that stakeholders in the weak industry need to 
present their voice more compared to stakeholders in the competitive industry, since the 
probability of sacrificing of weak industry is higher than the competitive industry. 
 Our results show that there is no significant relationship between the tariff and 
SPS notifications. This result contradicts the law of constant protection. Three possible 
explanations exist for our results. First, SPS regulations are just one type of non-tariff 
barriers. There may be several other non-tariff barriers, but they are difficult to measure 
empirically. Second, agricultural sectors have different characteristics compared to 
manufacturing sectors since they depend more heavily on non-tariff barriers rather than 
tariff barriers. Third, trade conflicts or WTO penalties, which can come from increasing 
non-tariff barriers, constrain governments from setting higher non-tariff barriers. 
 The results of this paper indicate that statist approaches explain the determinants 
for SPS notifications well, since the relative size of agricultural sectors has a positive 
effect on SPS notifications. The results also indicate that societal approaches do not well 
explain the determinants for SPS notifications because the unemployment rate in 
agricultural sectors does not have a significant effect on SPS notifications. In other 
words, politicians make trade policy based on pressure groups rather than national 
interests. These results have implications for governments and stakeholders. First, 
governments can have a better strategy during trade negotiations with other countries 
based on our results. Governments should pursue their countries’ benefit from trade 
negotiation by focusing on industries in foreign countries that have no pressure groups 
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and lower competitiveness. Second, stakeholders in industries with incompetent pressure 
groups have to realize that they are likely to face more stringent competition from 
imports, because governments will not protect them. Thus, they need to organize their 
interest groups for protecting their own interests.  
 GDP per capita has a positive effect on SPS notifications, which suggests that 
food safety demand explains variations in SPS notifications. This result indicates that 
high income people are more sensitive to food safety problems compared to low income 
people since SPS notifications are related with food safety.  
 The results of this paper have some limiting factors. First is the dataset itself. This 
paper uses aggregated data for the agricultural sector, however, if we can get more 
detailed data, we could have a more detailed analysis to capture the specific 
characteristics of agricultural sectors which have an effect on SPS notifications. Second 
is this paper does not consider all non-tariff barriers. Thus, there is a need to find some 
way to consolidate other non-tariff barriers, such as TBT or quota, since SPS 
notifications is just one of non-tariff barriers in agricultural sectors.  
 Even though this paper has some limitations, our contribution is clear. First, this 
paper questions the linearity assumption for non-tariff barrier determination. Using a 
threshold nonlinearity specification, we test for nonlinearity in SPS notifications based on 
GDP per capita and tariff level and find it to be a linear relationship. Furthermore, we 
derive implications for quality competition based on our threshold test results. Second, 
this paper finds that food safety concerns are related non-tariff barriers such that SPS 
notifications are connected with food safety demand as well as tariff reductions. Lastly, 
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this study provides the basic logic to governments for negotiating trade barrier 
reductions.  
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Chapter Four  
 
The Impact of Trade Barriers on Skilled and Unskilled Employment of Food 
Manufacture Firms in Developing Countries 
4.1 Introduction 
 Unemployment imposes costs to individuals as well as countries. To the 
individual, a lost job means deterioration in living standards because of reduction of 
income and job searching costs, likely leading to reduced consumption. To the country, 
unemployment leads to lower gross domestic product (GDP) and higher government 
costs related to state and federal governments providing unemployment benefits and 
other income supports. Furthermore, sustained unemployment can lead to increased 
social problems such as suicide, depression, and other illnesses (Andrés, 2005). For these 
reasons, there is a need to keep the unemployment rate at an appropriate low level. 
However, the world unemployment rate has fluctuated steadily since 1991 (Figure 4.1), 
and figuring out factors that lead to unemployment fluctuation has important policy 
implications. 
 Large parts of recent fluctuation in unemployment can be explained by a rapid 
globalization trend that implies a reduction of trade barriers. Technological innovation 
has spread more quickly over time due to increased flow of information and trade 
openness. Many papers show that technology is transferred through trade in intermediate 
goods (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Keller, 2001; Keller, 2002). Frankel and Rose (2002) 
suggest that international trade leads to productivity growth through increases in 
technology. Furthermore, trade liberalization leads to increased competition, so that each 
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firm has more incentive to adopt new technologies and machinery. The technology 
innovation that is caused by a reduction of trade barriers leads to a decrease of 
employment if the innovation is based on labor-reducing technologies (Koellinger, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 4.1 World Unemployment Rate 
Source: World Bank 
 
Trade liberalization also encourages countries to specialize in specific sectors or 
industries where they have a comparative advantage based on the Hecksher-Ohlin theory. 
This specialization allows each country to enjoy scale economies as resources shift from 
sectors with high relative costs to sectors with low relative costs. Trade liberalization 
creates jobs in some sectors and destroys jobs in others, forcing labor to move across 
industries in accordance with each country’s comparative advantage. This labor 
reallocation creates unemployment in one sector and employment in the other. The more 
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friction there is in labor movements, the more unemployment will exist. Considering the 
worldwide trend in trade liberalization there is a need to focus on unemployment 
resulting from trade effects. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Numbers of Non-tariff Measures (2005-2016) 
Source: WTO Database (http://i-tip.wto.org/goods/Forms/GraphView.aspx?period=y&scale=ln) 
 
Previous empirical literature for trade and employment focus on industry or 
country levels rather than firm level. Even though some studies such as Haltiwanger et al. 
(2013) and Centeno et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between trade barriers and 
employment at the firm level, they do not use an econometric model for their firm-level 
analysis so they do not to find the determinants of employment in a rigorous statistical 
sense. Furthermore, previous studies focus on tariff barriers rather than non-tariff 
barriers. 
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Figure 4.3 World Non-tariff Barrier Claims to WTO (date: 6/60/2016; initiated and in 
force) 
Source: World Trade Organization 
Note: Anti-dumping [ADP], Countervailing [CV], Quantitative Restrictions [QR], Safeguards [SG], 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary [SPS] [Regular, Emergency], Special Safeguards [SSG], Technical Barriers to 
Trade [TBT] [Regular], Tariff-rate quotas [TRQ], Export Subsidies [XS] 
 
This paper focuses on a firm-level analysis of the relationship between trade and 
unemployment. Furthermore, in this study, trade liberalization measures include both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. Tariff barriers have decreased steadily through WTO 
negotiations, bilateral trade agreements, and multilateral agreements. On the other hand, 
non-tariff barriers do not show a decreasing trend (Figure 4.2). As a result, the 
importance of non-tariff barriers has increased compared to tariff barriers, especially for 
the food and agriculture sector. Our analysis focuses on the effects of trade policy on 
unemployment, especially involving non-tariff barriers. According to WTO specification, 
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Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Photosanitary (SPS) barriers are 
representative of non-tariff barriers (Figure 4.3). TBTs are applicable to all industries, but 
SPS barriers are only applicable to the agri-food sector because SPS relates to food 
safety.15 Since food safety relates directly to human health, agri-food industries have 
different regulations compared to other industries. This paper focuses on non-tariff 
barriers related to food safety of food industries. 
Utilizing a structural equation model and data for food manufacturing firms in 
developing countries registered on the World Bank Enterprise Survey, this paper 
investigates the impact of trade barriers on employment. This paper also divides the 
employment in the food manufacturing industries into skilled and unskilled labor. The 
production process within the food industry mainly requires low-skills (Fuller, 2001), so 
unskilled workers are mainly used for food products. Thus, this paper assumes that the 
trade liberalization effect on employment in the food industry is largely based on 
unskilled rather than skilled workers. This paper contributes to the empirical work on the 
relationship between trade and unemployment in several ways. First, this paper considers 
trade liberalization effects at the firm level rather than the country or industry level. Firm 
level analysis provides more detailed information compared to the country or industry 
level analysis because it contains firm level characteristics that are absent at other levels. 
For example, if exporting firms create more jobs than non-exporting firms do, then 
government funds may need to concentrate on helping exporting firms. One way to 
support exporting firms is through export incentives such as interest rates, taxes, or legal 
                                                          
15 According to Aisbett and Pearson (2012), the objective of SPS is protecting human, plant, and animal 
health. 
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incentives. Second, this study divides employment into skilled and unskilled workers 
since the production within the food industry does not require high skills. Thus, we can 
provide policy implications to government based on which types of workers in food 
manufacturing are more affected by trade liberalization.  
4.2 Theoretical Background for Employment 
 There are several theoretical models for the determination of employment. The 
neoclassical theory of labor markets explains the determination of wage and employment 
primarily through the supply side of the economy (Abdalla et al., 2010). It focuses on 
workers’ choices between labor and leisure, ignoring labor demand. Human capital 
theory tries to explain employment and wages through public and private investments in 
education or skills training (Becker, 2009). Higher skills indicate higher marginal 
productivity, which leads to higher income. Moreover, higher skills with a higher 
marginal productivity attracts employers to hire higher-skilled workers compared to 
lower skilled workers. However, these theoretical models do not explain the employment 
fluctuation since they have the implicit assumption of no voluntary unemployment.  
On the other hand, the Keynesian theory of employment explains fluctuations in 
employment well. This theory assumes that employment is determined by the firms’ 
output, given the technology (Gali, 2013).16 In other words, macroeconomic variations 
explain variations in employment through macroeconomic effects on firms’ outputs. For 
example, Black (1982), Lilien (1982) and Davis (1987) find that the business cycle has an 
impact on labor allocation among industries, which brings about unemployment to 
                                                          
16 A firm’s output is a function of aggregate demand for goods (Gali, 2013) 
66 
 
specific industries. Paul and Siegel (2001) find that technology has a large effect on 
changes in labor composition between skilled and unskilled labor. Doğrul and Soytas 
(2010) also argue that macroeconomic variables such as business cycle and technology 
level have a large role in explaining the level of unemployment.  
For these reasons, some literature focuses on the relationship between trade and 
unemployment (Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010). The main two theoretical approaches to 
explaining comparative advantage, the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin approaches have 
differing results relative to trade liberalization and unemployment. The Ricardian model, 
based on comparative advantage, shows that trade liberalization leads to decreases in 
unemployment (Dutt et al., 2009).17 On the other hand, the Hecksher-Ohlin model shows 
that only labor abundant countries can reduce unemployment through trade liberalization 
(Dutt et al., 2009). The theoretical literature on the relationship between trade and 
unemployment is relatively small, though the theoretical literature is larger than the 
empirical literature (Hasan et al., 2012). 
4.3 Empirical Literature for Trade and Employment 
There are few empirical literatures for the relationship between trade and 
unemployment. Greenaway et al. (1999) investigate the impact of trade on employment 
of 167 manufacturing industries in United Kingdom utilizing panel data from 1979 to 
1991. They find that an increased volume of exports and imports has a negative effect on 
                                                          
17 Dutt, et al. (2009) argue that trade liberalization leads to a change in the relative price between two goods 
(X and Y). If the price of X increases and the price of Y decreases, then the profitability of good X will 
increase. In this case, wages in X increase and employers have an incentive to move from Y to X. At 
the same time, capital moves to X, which allows improved productivity in X. In the end, jobs producing 
X increase and jobs producing Y decrease. The increased number of jobs producing X is larger than the 
decreased number of jobs producing Y (Dutt et al., 2009). 
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derived labor demand. Attanasio et al. (2004) show that a tariff rate has a small positive 
effect on share of industry employment utilizing the data from Columbia. The results of 
Porto (2008) represent that 10% increase of export price triggers an increase of 
employment probability by 1.36 percentage points. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) 
examine the Brazil’s trade liberalization effect in the 1990s on employment. They present 
the result that tariff reduction leads worker displacements even if workers in industries 
with comparative advantage. To sum up, most empirical studies for trade liberalization 
and employment focus on state or industry level rather than firm level. However, it is 
likely that individual firms in the same state or industry have a different relationship 
between trade and unemployment.  
Most studies on determinants of firm level unemployment (employment) focus on 
firm characteristics rather than on trade liberalization effects on unemployment 
(employment). For example, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) includes determinants of firm-
level job creation and destruction, such as firm size, firm age, and firm birth. Firm size as 
a factor in job creation is supported by Gibrat’s law, which represents an inverse 
relationship between firm size and growth (Sutton, 1997). Firm age and births may have 
an inverse relationship with the employment rate since Centeno et al. (2007) find that 
average firm age has an inverse relationship with job creation. These firm-level studies 
find the determinants of unemployment (employment) by comparing firm characteristics 
and employment trends. These previous studies do not consider firm-level trade policy 
effects on employment. 
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4.4 Model Development 
 This paper follows the empirical model suggested by Greenaway et al. (1999). 
They assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with the representative firm: 
 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝐴
𝛾𝐾𝑖𝑡𝑗
𝛼 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑗
𝛽
 (1) 
  
where country i, year t, firm j, and Q is output, A is technology, K is capital, L is unit of 
labor used by a firm, and coefficients (α and β) indicate shares for each factor and γ 
indicates the technology for the production process.  
The conditions for profit maximization, i.e., Marginal Revenue of Labor = Wage 
(w) and Marginal Revenue of Capital = Interest Rate (r), allow us to obtain equation (2) 
from equation (1): 
 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝐴
𝛾(
𝛼𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑗
𝛽
∙
𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
)𝛼𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑗
𝛽
 (2) 
 
Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (2) and rearranging the terms according to 
labor demand (L). 
 𝐿𝑖𝑗 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1 ln (
𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
) + 𝜙2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 (3) 
 
where 𝜙0 = −(𝛾𝑙𝑛𝐴 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝛼 − 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝛽)/(𝛼 + 𝛽), 𝜙1 = −
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
, and 𝜙2 = 1/(𝛼 + 𝛽). 
 Badinger (2008) summarizes several ways that greater international trade can 
affect productivity. The first channel is increasing returns to scales from enjoying a larger 
market by trade (Balassa, 2013). The second way is the spillover effect from 
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experiencing the foreign market (Feder, 1983). The last channel is the international 
transmission of technology (Coe and Helpman, 1995). Productivity is a proxy variable for 
a technology, which means that trade has an effect on technology growth. Thus, 
Greenaway et al. (1999) suggests that A (technology) can be specified as a function of 
factors that influence trade. We modify their equation to obtain the following function: 
 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝑒
𝛿0𝐶𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝛿1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝛿2 (4) 
 
where C is the country effect, T is the tariff rate, and S is SPS. 
 Using equations (3) and (4), we derive the following equation: 18 
 ln𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝜙0
∗ + 𝜇0𝐶 − 𝜇1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇2𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙1 ln (
𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
) + 𝜙2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 (5) 
 
where 𝜙0
∗ = −
𝛼𝑙𝑛𝛼−𝛼𝑙𝑛𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
, 𝜇0 = 𝜇𝛿0, 𝜇1 = 𝜇𝛿1, 𝜇2 = 𝜇𝛿2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜇 = 𝛾/(𝛼 + 𝛽) 
4.5 The Empirical Model and Estimation Method 
 This paper adopts a structural equation model (SEM) to estimate the effects of 
trade liberalization on employment due to several econometric advantages. First, SEM 
allows one to estimate skilled and unskilled labor employment at the same time. This is 
possible because the SEM analyzes multivariate data with linear relationships among 
variables (Savalei and Bentler, 2010), and the SEM is considered as a mixture of factor 
                                                          
18 Firm characteristics are added as control variables in this paper. 
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and path analysis (Hox and Bechger, 1998).19 Second, considering the possible 
covariance between errors of skilled and unskilled employment, SEM allows one to 
overcome the endogeneity problem. Third, SEM can treat variables as exogenous and 
endogenous at the same time by estimating multiple equations simultaneously (McCoach 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, the generalized SEM (GSEM) takes into account hierarchical 
data characteristics.20 The dataset for this study also has a hierarchy of upper and lower 
levels (2-dimensions). The upper level is the country level and the lower level is the firm 
level. 
Using GSEM, this study models two different aspects that are not covered by the 
previous literature. First, employment is divided into skilled and unskilled where the food 
industry heavily depends on low-skilled workers. Second, possible covariance between 
the error terms in the equation for the skilled and unskilled labor functions is captured. 
Covariance between errors may exist since skilled and unskilled employment share 
unobserved effects. This possible covariance is shown in equation (6). Furthermore, a 
dummy variable for countries is added to the empirical model to capture possible 
heteroscedasticity across countries.21 The model specification is shown in the following 
equations:22 
                                                          
19 Garson (2008) defines path analysis as “An extension of the regression model, used to test the fit of the 
correlation matrix against two or more casual models that are being compared by the researcher”. 
20 Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) explain a hierarchical data structure as “Hierarchical in the following 
sense: We have variables describing individuals, but the individuals also are grouped into larger units, 
each unit consisting of a number of individuals”. 
21 Data on the wage and interest rate are limited. The wage and interest rate for each firm may be similar for 
all firms within a country; thus, the country fixed effect may capture the 
𝑤
𝑟
  term. 
22 Skilled and unskilled employment equations are from equation (5). To capture the indirect effect of trade 
barriers, the production equation is contained in GSEM. The covariance term is also contained in 
GSEM to capture possible correlation between 1𝑖𝑡𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 2𝑖𝑡𝑗 . 
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ln (Skilled_𝐿)𝑖𝑡𝑗
= 𝛽01 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽31𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋
′𝛼 + 𝑎𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑡𝑗 
 
ln(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐿)𝑖𝑡𝑗
= 𝛽02 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋
′𝛼 + 𝑎𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑡𝑗 
 
Cov( 1𝑖𝑡𝑗, 2𝑖𝑡𝑗) = 𝜌1𝜌2 
 
(6) 
where, i is a country, t is a year,  j is a firm, Total_L is total employment, Skilled_L is 
skilled employment, Unskilled_L is unskilled employment, T is a tariff rate, S is SPS, Q 
is production quantity, X is a vector of firm characteristics,  and  and 𝛿 are error terms. 
 For a robustness check, this paper estimates three different models. The first 
model is the generalized structural equation model without the covariance term. The 
second model is the generalized structural equation model without the production 
function. The third model has three separate regressions. Table 4.1 summarizes the three 
models.  
Table 4.1 Alternative Models for a Robustness Check 
Model Description Equation 
Model 1 
Without 
Covariance 
 
ln (Skilled_𝐿)𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽01 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽31𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋
′𝛼 + 𝑎𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑡𝑗  
 
ln(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐿)𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽02 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋
′𝛼 + 𝑎𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑡𝑗  
 
 
Model 2 
With 
Covariance 
 
ln (Skilled_𝐿)𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽01 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽31𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋
′𝛼 + 𝑎𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑡𝑗  
 
ln(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐿)𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽02 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋
′𝛼 + 𝑎𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑡𝑗  
 
Cov( 1𝑖𝑡𝑗 , 2𝑖𝑡𝑗) = 𝜌1𝜌2 
 
 
Model 3 
Separate 
Regressions 
 
ln (Skilled_𝐿)𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽01 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽31𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋
′𝛼 + 𝑎𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑡𝑗  
 
ln(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐿)𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽02 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋
′𝛼 + 𝑎𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑡𝑗  
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 4.6. Data Description 
 This paper uses the World Bank Enterprise Survey data to estimate the effects of 
reduced trade barriers on firm level employment. The World Bank Enterprise Survey data 
consists of firm characteristics and the firm’s environment such as regulations, taxes, 
corruption, crime, informality, gender, finance, infrastructure, innovation, technology, 
trade, workforce, firm characteristics, and performance. Among these data, this paper 
uses skilled employment, unskilled employment, production sales (proxy for quantity), 
and firm characteristics (firm age, firm size, exporting or not) from 2006 to 2014.23  
Table 4.2 Descriptive Summary Statistics (N=1,673) 
Variable Type Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Exp. 
Sign 
ln_skilled_worker continuous 
Number of skilled production 
worker 
2.650 1.556  
ln_unskilled_worker continuous 
Number of unskilled 
production worker 
2.766 1.564  
ln_tariff continuous Weighted average tariff rate 2.824 0.672 - 
ln_sps continuous Number of SPS notifications 2.156 1.406 - 
ln_quantity continuous Real annual sales growth (%) 2.380 1.166 + 
ln_age continuous Number of firm age 2.914 0.807 + 
size binary 
1 if the firm size is large; 0 
otherwise 
0.305 0.461 + 
exporter binary 
1 if the firm export; 0 
otherwise 
0.213 0.409 + 
                                                          
23 After managing the data, the maximum period for analysis is 2006 to 2014. The World Bank Enterprise 
Survey is performed periodically in each country, thus the dataset of this paper is an unbalanced panel. 
Developing countries are defined as those with an income lower than $12,476 (World Bank definition). 
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Data on SPS notifications are collected from the WTO integrated trade 
intelligence portal. Data on the weighted average tariff rate are gathered from the trade 
analysis information system of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). Our sample has 1,864 firm observations with 21 developing 
countries. Table 4.2 shows descriptive summary statistics with expected sign for all 
variables used in this analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Histogram for Food Manufacturing Firm Age within the Dataset 
 
  Figure 4.4 shows the histogram for the age of food manufacturing firms within the 
dataset from 2006 to 2014. This histogram indicates that most firms are less than 30 years 
old. The two most frequent ages for firms are both less than 10 years of tenure. This 
phenomenon may represent two aspects. First, the food industry in developing countries 
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
0 50 100 150 200
Firm Age (Year)
74 
 
may not be matured since developing countries are normally in the early stage of 
development. Second, food manufacturers in developing countries are small, and small 
firms close their businesses more often compared to large firms. Thus, the firm age of 
most food manufacturers in developing countries is young compared to developed 
countries such as the U.S. (Figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Firm Age Share of Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting in U.S. (2016) 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/bdm/us_age_naics_11_table5.txt) 
 
 Table 4.3 shows the skilled worker ratio of food manufacturing firms in 
developing countries. Most firms employ around 30% skilled workers and the average 
share for developing countries is 40%. Thus, food industry employment in developing 
countries is dominated by unskilled labor. 
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Table 4.3 Skilled Worker Ratio of Food Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries 
Country 
Skilled Worker 
Ratio 
Country 
Skilled Worker 
Ratio 
Argentina 0.30 Nicaragua 0.34 
Bolivia 0.33 Peru 0.26 
Brazil 0.37 Philippines 0.43 
Chile 0.34 Russian Federation 0.48 
Colombia 0.26 Sri Lanka 0.62 
Ecuador 0.32 Turkey 0.42 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.52 Uganda 0.37 
El Salvador 0.25 Ukraine 0.51 
Guatemala 0.36 Uruguay 0.31 
Indonesia 0.61 Vietnam 0.38 
Jordan 0.58 Total Average 0.40 
 
4.7. Estimation Results  
 Table 4.4 shows the results of the structural equation model with the covariance 
term (main model), structural equation model without the covariance term (model 1), and 
three separate regression models (model 2). Results of these three model show that 
coefficients and their significance are similar for all models. Furthermore, the covariance 
between the error of unskilled worker equation and skilled worker equation is positive 
and significant at the 1% significant level. Thus, capturing the covariance between errors 
is important in deriving unbiased estimators. 
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Table 4.4 Results from the Estimation of Models 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Main Model Model 1 Model 2 
ln_skilled  ln_quantity -0.0029  -0.0029  -0.0030  
  (0.02335)  (0.02335)  (0.02354)  
 ln_tariff -0.1408  -0.1408  -0.1408  
  (0.29906)  (0.29906)  (0.30150)  
 ln_sps 0.0291  0.0291  0.0292  
  (0.09109)  (0.09109)  (0.09184)  
 ln_age 0.1284 *** 0.1284 *** 0.1284 *** 
  (0.03516)  (0.03516)  (0.03544)  
 size 2.1969 *** 2.1969 *** 2.1969 *** 
  (0.06172)  (0.06172)  (0.06222)  
 exporter 0.3340 *** 0.3340 *** 0.3340 *** 
  (0.06982)  (0.06982)  (0.07039)  
 Intercept 1.7421 * 1.7421 * 1.7421 * 
  (1.0147)  (1.0147)  (1.02296)  
ln_unskilled ln_quantity 0.0304  0.0271  0.0272  
  (0.02862)  (0.02922)  (0.02959)  
 ln_tariff -0.9061 *** -0.8415 ** -0.8415 ** 
  (0.02862)  (0.35100)  (0.35548)  
 ln_sps -0.3052 *** -0.2758 ** -0.2758 ** 
  (0.10659)  (0.10847)  (0.10985)  
 ln_age 0.4301  0.0364  0.0364  
  (0.04117)  (0.04190)  (0.04244)  
 size 2.2319 *** 2.2148 *** 2.2149 *** 
  (0.07046)  (0.07158)  (0.07249)  
 exporter 0.3757 *** 0.3475 *** 0.3479 *** 
  (0.07878)  (0.07994)  (0.08096)  
 Intercept 5.0395 *** 4.8236 *** 4.8236 *** 
  (1.17950)  (1.1999)  (1.21523)  
e.ln_skilled 
1.122  1.122  -  
(0.0388)  (0.0388)  -  
e.ln_unskilled 
1.0633  1.0682  -  
(0.0456)  (0.0460)  -  
Cov (e.ln_unskilled,e.ln_skilled) 
0.3326 *** -  -  
(0.0330)  -  -  
Observations 1,673  1,673  1,673  
Log likelihood -3,980  -4,035  -  
R-square for ln_skilled -  -  0.54  
R-square for ln_unskilled -  -  0.56  
Note: ***, **, * Significant 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. () is standard error 
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Discussion focuses on the Hecksher-Ohlin theory with the results of structural 
equation model with the covariance term between errors of skilled and unskilled workers 
(the main model). Tariff and SPS notifications do not have a significant effect on skilled 
labor employment from technological change by food manufacturers. This result supports 
the Hecksher-Ohlin theory since skilled laborers are not abundant in developing countries 
compared to developed countries.24 Fuller (2001) argues that the food industry heavily 
depends on low-skilled workers for the production process. 
Firm characteristics, such as firm size and being an exporter, have a positive 
effect on unskilled employment of food manufacturers, as expected. However, firm age 
does not have a significant effect on unskilled employment, which contrasts with the 
result for skilled labor. This result indicates that the process of firm aging in the food 
industry of developing countries requires high skilled labor rather than low skilled labor. 
That might be related with the age structure of food firms in developing countries (Figure 
4.4). The ratio of firms aged over 10 years is low, which means that the survival rate of 
food firms in developing countries is lower over time. In other words, only a few food 
firms in developing countries survive 10 years after their formation, which means that 
few firms change their production structure from low-skill to high-skill labor technology. 
                                                          
24 According to the Hecksher-Ohlin theory based on comparative advantage, high-skilled labour scarce 
economies, such as developing countries, cannot increase high-skilled employment by trade 
liberalization of tariff or non-tariff barriers. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
 This paper investigates the effect of trade barriers on skilled and unskilled 
employment of food manufacturers in developing countries. This study captures the 
differential impacts of tariff versus non-tariff trade barriers on employment in food 
manufacturing. The results of this paper show that a reduction of trade barriers has a 
positive effect on low-skilled employment by food manufacturers. Tariff barriers have a 
larger effect on low-skilled employment by food manufacturers compared to nontariff 
barriers (SPS notifications). On the other hand, trade barriers do not have a significant 
effect on skilled employment. 
 The results of this paper provide some policy implications for governments and 
firms. First, governments of developing countries may need to support food firms through 
other policies when they reduce non-tariff barriers. Our results show that a reduction of 
SPS has a negative effect on food firm production in developing countries. Furthermore, 
governments should focus their negotiation strategies on tariff reductions in the food 
industry since a tariff reduction does not cause decreased production. 
 Second, governments of developing countries need to promote the trade of food 
manufacturing goods since a reduction of trade barriers has a positive effect on unskilled 
employment in food manufacturers. Considering that the food industry is mainly 
protected by non-tariff barriers being related to food safety (in terms of microbiology and 
toxicology) and quality (in terms of appearance and taste) (Fryer and Versteeg, 2008), 
new technology focusing on food safety and quality would overcome the trade barriers 
for food safety. One example is supporting food firms to obtain private or third party 
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certifications such as GlobalGAP and SQF.25 Private and third party certifications need 
more technology since this type of certification requires higher food safety levels 
compared to government standards. Furthermore, adapting to private or third party 
certifications is helpful for developing countries to reach export markets (Kleemann et 
al., 2014). Thus, supporting firms for third party certifications may help increase 
employment by increased exports. 
Third, firms need to plan for their future employment based on their internal and 
external environment. The internal environment represents firm characteristics such as 
firm age and firm size, and the external environment indicates surroundings of firms such 
as tariff and non-tariff barriers. The results of this paper show that firm age has a positive 
effect on skilled employment by food manufacturing firms. Based on this result, old firms 
need to focus on skilled labor rather than unskilled labor compared to young firms. The 
results of this paper indicate that a reduction in tariff and SPS barriers has a positive 
effect on unskilled employment of developing countries. Based on this result, the 
implementation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements may increase unskilled 
employment in developing countries.  
  
                                                          
25 Third party or private certifications is normally higher than government certifications in terms of quality 
and safety (Henson and Reardon, 2005).  
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Chapter Five 
 
 Summary and Conclusions 
 This dissertation investigates three issues of food safety regulations and 
international trade of agricultural products. Chapter 2 examines the impact of MRL on 
U.S. vegetable exports based on the specification of a gravity model. Our results show 
that a strict MRL of importing countries has a negative effect on vegetable imports, while 
a higher level of MRL in U.S. has a positive effect on U.S. vegetable exports. This 
implies that the government should evaluate strict food safety regulations based on three 
aspects: first is human health, second is a role of non-tariff barrier, and the last is the 
competitiveness of vegetable producers from the signalling effect. By utilizing the 
multilevel model with random income effect according to each countries, we find that the 
impact of MRL in U.S. on U.S. vegetable exports is not different between high and low-
income countries. This implies that most countries have a common tendency to establish 
the strict food safety regulations for the human health regardless of each countries’ 
income level.   
 Chapter 3 figures out the political determinants of non-tariff barriers that are 
associated with food safety by utilizing the threshold regression method. Based on the 
threshold non-linear test results, we find that there is no threshold with respect to GDP 
per capita and tariff rate. No threshold in GDP per capita implies that the income of 
country does not make difference in food safety demand. No threshold in tariff rate 
represents the dominance of a political view on an economic view. If governments select 
their non-tariff rates based on an economic view, then there might exist a threshold value 
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in tariff rate. It is because a reduction of tariff rate on welfare is different to industries, 
which represents economic value for non-tariff barrier adjustment to tariff rate is 
different. We find that GDP per capita is positively associated with SPS notifications, 
implying the importance of quality competition in food sector. Our results also show that 
there is no significant relationship between tariff and SPS notifications, which implies 
that a law of constant protection, the inverse relationship between tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, is not satisfied in the food sector.  
Chapter 4 examines the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers on skilled and low-
skilled employment in developing countries’ food firms. Our results represent that a 
reduction of trade barriers (both tariff and non-tariff) is directly and positively associated 
with unskilled employment. However, trade barriers are not associated with skilled labor 
employment. These results imply that the Hecksher-Ohlin theory is well fitted to food 
firms in developing countries. The food industries require low-skilled workers rather than 
skilled workers and developing countries abundant in low-skilled labor; in turn, the trade 
openness is expected to increase the low-skilled employment in developing countries. 
Interestingly, age of firm is positively only related to skilled employment, which implies 
that aged food firms in developing countries tend to change their production process from 
labor intensive to machine or capital intensive production. 
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